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ARTICLE
ORIGINALISM AND THE AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION DECISIONS
Douglas G. Smitht
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's recent affirmative action decisions have
generated significant controversy.' Already, commentators have
criticized the Court's companion decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger
2
and Gratz v. Bollinger,3 as either unprincipled or incomprehensi-
ble. In Grutter, the Court upheld the University of Michigan's use
of race as a factor in law school admissions. In Gratz, the Court at
the same time struck down the University of Michigan's use of
race as a factor in undergraduate admissions. Yet, it is difficult to
discern a clear principle distinguishing the two cases.
Some commentators, and indeed members of the Court them-
Partner, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Chicago, IL. J.D., Northwestern University School of
Law; M.B.A., The University of Chicago; B.S./B.A., State University of New York at Buffalo.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
those of Kirkland & Ellis LLP or its clients. The title of this article is a play on the title of Judge
McConnell's excellent article on the Fourteenth Amendment and Brown v. Board of Education,
Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947
(1995). I would like to thank Jim Chen for reviewing a prior draft of this article and offering
valuable comments.
I Several commentators have considered the constitutionality of affirmative action pro-
grams in higher education in recent years. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Af-
firmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1195 (2002); Richard A. Epstein, A
Rational Basis for Affirmative Action: A Shaky But Classical Liberal Defense, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 2036 (2002); Jack Greenberg, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Confronting the
Condition and Theory, 43 B.C. L. REV. 521 (2002); John Hasnas, Equal Opportunity, Affirma-
tive Action, and the Anti-Discrimination Principle: The Philosophical Basis for the Legal Pro-
hibition of Discrimination, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 423 (2002); Gail L. Heriot, Strict Scrutiny,
Public Opinion, and Affirmative Action on Campus: Should the Courts Find a Narrowly Tai-
lored Solution to a Compelling Need in a Policy Most Americans Oppose?, 40 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 217 (2003); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427 (1997); Peter H.
Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1 (2002).
2 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
3 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
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selves, have suggested that the decisions will spawn a new-round
of litigation to determine myriad questions regarding permissible
affirmative action programs that the decisions do not resolve.4
Others have concluded that the decisions are far more clear cut,
standing forcefully for the proposition that the use of race in col-
lege and university admissions can be justified based on the need
to obtain the educational benefits of a "diverse" student body.
5
What is striking about the Court's decisions, however, and has
received little comment is that the opinions in Grutter and Gratz
are almost devoid of any attempt to ascertain the original meaning
of the relevant constitutional provisions.6 While members of the
4 See, e.g., Jennifer C. Braceras, Commentary, Diversity Rationale Not Compelling, 26
LEGAL TIMES 59 (June 30, 2003) ("By endorsing the diversity rationale, but making each col-
lege or university's plan subject to fact-specific inquiry, the Court has essentially created a full
employment plan for lawyers."); Steven Lubet, Editorial, Affirmative Action Battle Has Just
Begun, BALT. SUN 15A (June 25, 2003) ("The court's ruling contains a virtual road map for
years of continuing litigation in which many affirmative action programs are very likely to
lose."); Derrick Bell, Diversity's Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1628 (2003) (the
Court's opinions "will likely encourage affirmative action opponents to mount more litigation
challenges as well as exert pressure for the appointment of judges opposed to affirmative action
in any form"); cf. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Getting Serious About Race: The Next 25 Years, 35 NAT'L
J. 2085 (2003) (describing the majority opinion in Grutter as "a sorry muddle of 'utter logical
confusion"').
5 See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, The Fallout Begins: In Its Final Week of the Term, the Supreme
Court Hands Down Landmark Rulings that Give Legal Backing to Two Kinds of Diversity, 25
NAT'L L.J. 1, 25 (July 7, 2003) ("'It's a total defeat,' said U.S. Civil Rights Commissioner
Abigail Thernstrom, who has written and spoken against race preferences for 25 years."); Jan
Crawford Greenburg, Supreme Court Narrowly Upholds Affirmative Action, CHI. TRIB. Cl
(June 24, 2003) ("'This is a tremendous victory for the University of Michigan, for all of higher
education, and for the hundreds of groups and individuals who supported us,' said university
President Mary Sue Coleman."); Gail Heriot, Commentary, Supreme Court Decision Upholds
Principle of Racial Preferences, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. GI (June 29, 2003) ("Grutter is a
huge loss for those who favor race neutrality."); Tony Mauro, Court Affirms Continued Need for
Preferences, 229 N.Y. L.J. 1 (June 24, 2003) (observing that "[t]he U.S. Supreme Court yester-
day gave a surprising and historic embrace to the concept of affirmative action in university
admissions").
6 The amendment has been the subject of a wealth of academic commentary. See, e.g.,
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998); RAOUL
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1997); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986); EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS,
THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869 (1990); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988);
MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? (1994); MICHAEL
J. PERRY, "WE THE PEOPLE": THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT
(1999); Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103
YALE L.J. 57 (1993); William Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History" and
the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954); Charles Fairman,
Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949); John
Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385 (1992);
Thomas B. McAffee, Inalienable Rights, Legal Enforceability, and American Constitutions: The
Fourteenth Amendment and the Concept of Unenumerated Rights, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
747 (2001); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L.
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Court issued multiple opinions in each case, there is little analysis
concerning what the ratifiers or drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment understood by its guarantee of "equal protection."
Nor is there any analysis of how this historical understanding may
be applied to the use of racial preferences in university admissions.
This is quite significant given the purported reliance upon an
originalist approach to constitutional interpretation by at least cer-
tain members of the Court. Indeed, while there have been numer-
ous instances in which the Court has deviated significantly from
the Constitution's original meaning, it has nonetheless periodically
emphasized that in interpreting the Constitution, recourse must be
made to "[o]ur Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices." 7
An originalist analysis in Gratz and Grutter might have pro-
vided additional clarity and legitimacy to the Court's decisionmak-
ing. Both the traditional legal understanding and the common un-
derstanding of the proper role of judges in deciding cases require
courts to ascertain the meaning of constitutional or statutory provi-
sions attributed to them by those with the authority to enact such
measures into law.8 The proper role of judges is to interpret, not
create, new law.
This article examines potential originalist analyses of the con-
stitutionality of race-conscious affirmative action programs in uni-
versity admissions as well as potential reasons why neither the
parties nor the Court relied upon such analyses in evaluating the
University of Michigan's admissions policies. While one may
construct an originalist argument under which affirmative action
programs might be validated, as they were by the Court in Grutter,
such an argument faces significant practical hurdles.
First, it is difficult to construct an originalist analysis under
which the law school program at issue in Grutter would be upheld
while the undergraduate program at issue in Gratz would be in-
validated. An originalist analysis justifying the use of race in uni-
REV. 947 (1995).
7 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997); see also McIntyre v. Ohio Elec-
tions Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 359 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (stating that the
Court should base its decisions on the "original meaning, for '[tlhe Constitution is a written
instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. That which it meant when adopted, it means
now."' (quoting South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905))).
8 See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Methods of Interpreting the Commerce Clause: A Com-
parative Analysis, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1185, 1194 (2003) ("Originalism ... comports with the
traditional understanding of the role of judges in our constitutional democracy."); see also
Antonin J. Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 (1989) (describing
originalism as "more compatible with the nature and purpose of a Constitution in a democratic
system").
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versity admissions would most likely be based on the limited scope
of the amendment. One could argue that the historical record sug-
gests that the amendment's guarantees did not extend to the provi-
sion of government benefits. Under this interpretation, university
admissions would fall outside the scope of the amendment's guar-
antee. As a result, such an analysis would undermine the Court's
decision in Gratz.
Second, an originalist analysis would not provide the degree of
flexibility sought by members of the Court in resolving the ques-
tions presented to them. Because the originalist analysis focuses
on the scope of the amendment, it leads to a bright-line rule con-
cerning whether such programs are subject to judicial review. Un-
der such circumstances, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to
adopt a flexible, case-by-case approach.
Finally, an originalist analysis might be inconsistent with other
decisions of the Court. Thus, for example, any ruling upholding
race-conscious measures is at odds with the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Brown v. Board of Education.9 An originalist analysis that
posited that governmental benefits fell outside the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment would entail overruling the Court's deci-
sion in Brown that "separate but equal" public education systems
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protec-
tion. In contrast, an originalist analysis such as that advanced by
Justice Harlan in his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson0 that concluded
that the Fourteenth Amendment embodied the concept of a "color-
blind" Constitution would not allow the majority to uphold the
discriminatory law school admissions policy at issue in Grutter.
Accordingly, there are reasons that neither the Court nor the par-
ties would find it either desirable or possible to rely upon an
originalist analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Part I of this article discusses the Court's analysis of these con-
stitutional questions in Grutter and Gratz. The differences in these
two decisions are striking. While the Court's decision in Gratz
appears to adhere closely to its recent precedents evaluating gov-
ernmental use of race in affirmative action programs, its decision
in Grutter, while purporting to adhere to Justice Powell's decision
in the Bakke case, deviates significantly from the Court's more
recent decisions. In particular, the Court appeared to announce a
new principle of "deference" that would apply to educational insti-
tutions' consideration of race, arguably designed to limit the scope
9 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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of its decision upholding the University of Michigan Law School
admissions program to the educational context. Similarly, in a
rather cryptic passage, the Court appeared to impose sua sponte a
durational limitation on the law school's use of race as a factor in
admissions, thereby going well beyond mere deference in its re-
view of the law school's admissions program.
Part II presents an originalist analysis of the constitutionality
of affirmative action programs. While neither the majority nor
dissenting opinions offer much in the way of an examination of the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, such an analysis
may be constructed on either side of the question. In particular, an
originalist analysis may be used to justify the government's use of
race as a factor in university admissions, which may have consti-
tuted a more legitimate basis for the Court's decision in the Grut-
ter case.
Finally, Part III discusses potential practical problems in ap-
plying the originalist analysis, which may have resulted in the utter
lack of discussion of the text or history of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in both of the Court's affirmative action decisions. The
originalist analysis consistent with the outcome in Grutter suggests
that affirmative action programs in the context of university ad-
missions fall outside of the scope of the amendment, therefore con-
tradicting the Court's ruling in Gratz. Moreover, adopting such an
analysis would mean invalidating the Court's prior decision in
Brown, a result neither the parties nor the Court would find desir-
able. Finally, such an analysis may be antithetical to the Court
because it would deprive it of flexibility in such cases and would
constrain the scope of its own power.
I. THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DECISIONS
The Supreme Court's recent affirmative action decisions
largely maintain the status quo. While the Court was presented
with an opportunity to clarify its prior rulings in cases concerning
the constitutionality of affirmative action programs in college and
university admissions, it did not do so. Rather, the Court in its
twin decisions in Gratz and Grutter purported to adhere to Justice
Powell's opinion in the Bakke case.II
Before these cases were decided, there was much confusion
concerning the rules that must be applied in evaluating the consti-
tutionality of programs that use race as a factor in university ad-
11 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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missions. The Court's decisions in Gratz and Grutter did nothing
to clarify the situation. Indeed, they arguably added to the confu-
sion. The Court did not present a coherent framework for analyz-
ing university programs that consider race in admissions decisions.
Most obviously, in Gratz the Court ruled that the University of
Michigan's undergraduate admissions program unconstitutionally
discriminated on the basis of race, and in Grutter it concluded that
the university's law school admissions program passed constitu-
tional muster. The contrast in these two decisions received little
explanation.
Not only did the Court's rulings lack coherence, but they raised
new questions regarding potential conflicts with the Court's own
precedents. As certain members of the Court observed in Grutter,
the Court's analysis of the law school's admissions program was
arguably at odds with its prior decisions in cases such as Wygant,1
2
Croson,13 and Adarand.14 Further, the Court's analysis in Grutter
raises new issues regarding the constitutionality of affirmative
action programs that must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.
As a result, there is likely to be continued, and perhaps more ac-
tive, litigation stemming from the Court's failure to clarify the law
in this area.
A. Grutter v. Bollinger
In Grutter, the Court reviewed the admissions program of the
University of Michigan Law School, holding that the program's
use of race as a factor in admissions decisions to achieve a "criti-
cal mass" of underrepresented minority students was constitu-
tional. In deciding whether to admit a given student, the law
school considered a variety of factors, including the candidate's
race.' 5  The law school justified its admissions program on the
ground that it sought to achieve the educational benefits flowing
from a "diverse" student body. The law school did not contend
that its admissions policies sought to remedy any past discrimina-
tion. 1 6 Nor did it seek to assist members of certain "underrepre-
12 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986).
13 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989).
14 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995).
15 See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2331-32 ("The policy requires admissions officials to evalu-
ate each applicant based on all the information available in the file, including a personal state-
ment, letters of recommendation, and an essay describing the ways in which the applicant will
contribute to the life and diversity of the Law School.").
16 Cf Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274 (noting that the Board's actions were an attempt to allevi-
ate the effects of societal discrimination); Croson, 488 U.S. at 511 (explaining that the city
failed to establish that its actions were necessary to remedy past discrimination); Adarand, 515
[Vol. 55:1
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sented" minorities because they were economically disadvantaged.
Indeed, the law school specifically disavowed any intent to use
race as a proxy to assist disadvantaged applicants. 7  Rather, the
program was purely a race-conscious measure.
While the law school admissions policy did not "restrict the
types of diversity contributions eligible for 'substantial weight' in
the admissions process," the school had a "longstanding commit-
ment to 'one particular type of diversity,' that is, 'racial and ethnic
diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students from
groups which have been historically discriminated against, like
African-Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans."' 18 The law
school sought to enroll what it called a "critical mass" of such "un-
derrepresented minority students. ' ' 9
Under the theory espoused by the law school, a "critical mass"
of "underrepresented" minority students was necessary to prevent
such students from feeling "isolated or like spokespersons for their
race. ' 2° The school acknowledged that "a critical mass of under-
represented minority students could not be enrolled if admissions
decisions were based primarily on undergraduate GPAs and LSAT
scores." 2' Nonetheless, law school officials claimed that they "did
not seek to admit any particular number or percentage of underrep-
resented minority students. 22
U.S. at 237 (explaining that the government's actions were taken in response to the persistence
of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups).
But see Brief for Respondents Kimberly James et al. at 26, Grutter (No. 02-241) ("From at least
1868 forward, the University of Michigan Law School had not practiced de jure segregation.
But as described above, in the 1960s, it was a classic example of de facto segregation.").
17 Indeed, the law school admitted that it could not utilize a race-neutral program that ad-
mitted more low-income students because there were so many white students that fit into this
category that such a program would not achieve the desired racial balance. See Respondent's
Brief at 36-37, Grutter (No. 02-241) ("[T]here are still many more poor white students than
poor minority students in the pool from which the Law School draws .... Boalt Hall recently
experimented with admitting more low-income students but abandoned that experiment after
one year, concluding that it could not produce racial diversity."); see also Brief of Amici Curiae
Columbia University et al. in Support of Respondents at 3-4, Grutter (No. 02-241) & Gratz (No.
02-516) ("Each of the amici curiae, like virtually every university in the nation, has reached the
conclusion that completely race-blind admissions practices frustrate or otherwise impede its
effort to achieve a sufficient level of diversity in its student body to effectuate its academic
mission.").
18 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2332.
19 Id. at 2333; see also id. (noting that the Director of Admissions had testified that "at the
height of the admissions season, he would frequently consult the so-called 'daily reports' that
kept track of the racial and ethnic composition of the class (along with other information such as
residency status and gender)" to "ensure that a critical mass of underrepresented minority stu-
dents would be reached so as to realize the educational benefits of a diverse student body").
20 Id. at 2333-34.
21 Id. at 2333.
22 Id.
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Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court adopted Justice Pow-
eli's approach in the Bakke case,23 which she described as "the
touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions
policies. 24  According to Justice O'Connor, Justice Powell in his
Bakke decision "approved the university's use of race to further
only one interest: 'the attainment of a diverse student body."'
' 25
Nonetheless, Justice O'Connor observed that Justice Powell
was "careful to emphasize that in his view race 'is only one ele-
ment in a range of factors a university properly may consider in
attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student body.' ' 26  Other as-
pects of "diversity" were important in university admissions as
well. Moreover, Justice O'Connor acknowledged that "'govern-
ment may treat people differently because of their race only for the
most compelling reasons."'
2 7
Accordingly, the Court reaffirmed that in reviewing affirmative
action programs in university admissions it would continue to ap-
ply strict scrutiny under which racial classifications would be con-
stitutional "only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling
governmental interests. 28  In Grutter, the "compelling interest"
29was ensuring a "livelier, more spirited" classroom discussion.
In a striking statement, however, Justice O'Connor went even
further, indicating that "[t]he Law School's educational judgment
that . . . diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to
which we defer." 30 The statement is noteworthy because "defer-
ring" to the views of one of the parties in litigation seems at odds
with the Court's avowed application of "strict scrutiny" in review-
ing the law school's admissions policies. The Court claimed,
23 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
24 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2336; see also id. at 2337 ("[Tloday we,endorse Justice Powell's
view that student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in
university admissions.").
25 Id. at 2336 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311). See also id. at 2339 ("[W]e have never
held that the only governmental use of race that can survive strict scrutiny is remedying past
discrimination.... Today, we hold that the Law School has a compelling interest in attaining a
diverse student body.").
26 Id. at 2337 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314).
27 Id. (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227).
28 Id. at 2337-38; see also id. at 2338 (observing that "[nlot every decision influenced by
race is equally objectionable and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully
examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental deci-
sionmaker for the use of race in that particular context").
29 Id. at 2340; see also id. ("In addition to the expert studies and reports entered into evi-
dence at trial, numerous studies show that student body diversity promotes learning outcomes,
and 'better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better
prepares them as professionals."' (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae American Educational Re-
search Association at 3)).
30 Id. at 2339.
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nonetheless, that its "scrutiny of the interest asserted by the Law
School is no less strict for taking into account complex educational
judgments in an area that lies primarily within the expertise of the
university.' In so stating, the Court appeared to be attempting to
constrain its ruling to the context of university admissions. 32  In-
deed, it noted that "universities occupy a special niche in our con-
stitutional tradition. 33
The Court contrasted the goal of achieving classroom diversity
with "racial balancing, which is patently unconstitutional., 34  It
expressly distinguished the law school's desire to achieve a "criti-
cal mass" with such racial balancing. Thus, the Court observed
that a college or university could not attempt to "'assure within its
student body some specified percentage of a particular group
31 Id. ("Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference
to a university's academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits."); see also id.
("[A]ttaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School's proper institutional
mission, and that 'good faith' on the part of a university is 'presumed' absent 'a showing to the
contrary."' (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318-19)).
32 In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg observed, for example, that the ma-
jority decision in Grutter did not "necessitate reconsideration whether interests other than 'stu-
dent body diversity,' . . . rank as sufficiently important to justify a race-conscious government
program." Id. at 2348 n.* (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
33 Id. at 2339; see also id. ("In announcing the principle of student body diversity as a
compelling state interest, Justice Powell invoked our cases recognizing a constitutional dimen-
sion, grounded in the First Amendment, of educational autonomy.").
Certain amici also advanced the position that universities should be given deference in
crafting their admissions policies. See, e.g., Brief of the Law School Admission Council as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 7, Grutter (No. 02-241) ("University and law
school decisions about how best to pursue student-body diversity reflect educational policy
judgments entitled to substantial deference."); Brief of Amicus Curiae Michigan Governor
Jennifer M. Granholm et al. at 17-18, Grutter (No. 02-241) & Gratz (No. 02-516) ("Both the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution and art. VIII, [§1 5 of Michigan's Constitu-
tion confer upon the University of Michigan the right, as a separate autonomous entity, to make
academic choices with only limited judicial scrutiny."); Brief of Amici Curiae Columbia Uni-
versity et al. in Support of Respondents at 5, Grutter (No. 02-241) & Gratz (No. 02-516)
("[T]he First Amendment ... should be understood to limit the power of the government to
require all universities-public and private-to adopt completely race-neutral admissions poli-
cies."); Brief of Amici Curiae American Council on Education and 52 Other Higher Education
Organizations in Support of Respondents at 11, Grutter (No. 02-241) ("Particular deference is
owed educators' judgment about education because such matters require evaluation of cumula-
tive information for which those responsible for higher education are best qualified."); Brief of
Amici Curiae Judith Areen et al. at 2, Grutter (No. 02-241) ("[T]he Law School Deans believe
that universities and law schools should have the freedom to resolve these matters in ways that
they believe are most consistent with the academic and social missions of their schools-and
not through rigid constitutionalization of the admissions process by federal courts.").
34 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339 . In his separate opinion, Justice Thomas agreed that:
the issue of unconstitutional racial discrimination among the groups the Law School
prefers is not presented in this case, because petitioner has never argued that the Law
School engages in such a practice, and the Law School maintains that it does
not.... Thus, the Law School may not discriminate in admissions between similarly
situated blacks and Hispanics, or between whites and Asians.
Id. at 2363 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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merely because of its race or ethnic origin. "'35
Having established that the educational benefits of "diversity"
constituted a compelling state interest, the Court then proceeded to
analyze whether the University of Michigan program was narrowly
tailored to further that end. The Court reiterated that "[t]o be nar-
rowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program cannot use a
quota system. 3 6 Nonetheless, race could be used as a "plus" fac-
tor along with other considerations as long as each applicant was
given "individualized consideration": "As Justice Powell made
clear in Bakke, truly individualized consideration demands that
race be used in a flexible, nonmechanical way. 37
As a result, the Court held that "[w]hen using race as a 'plus'
factor in university admissions, a university's admissions program
must remain flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is evalu-
ated as an individual and not in a way that makes an applicant's
race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application.
'
"
38
Indeed, it noted that "[t]he importance of this individualized con-
sideration in the context of a race-conscious admissions program is
paramount."
39
Despite the limited record available to the Court, it concluded
that the Michigan admissions program did not "operate as a
quota. 4 0 In particular, it found that the law school's goal of "at-
taining a critical mass of underrepresented minority students" did
not "transform its program into a quota."4 1 Rather, the Court ob-
served that the law school admissions program provided the "indi-
vidualized" treatment of applicants that the Court indicated was
necessary to survive judicial scrutiny: "[T]he Law School engages
in a highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file,
giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might
contribute to a diverse educational environment.,
42
The Court specifically observed that there was "no policy, ei-
ther de jure or de facto, of automatic acceptance or rejection based
35 Id. at 2339 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307).
36 Id. at 2342.
37 Id.; see also id. (stating that universities may not "insulate applicants who belong to
certain racial or ethnic groups from the competition for admission," but may "consider race or
ethnicity more flexibly as a 'plus' factor in the context of individualized consideration of each
and every applicant").
38 Id. at 2343.
39 Id. (emphasis added).
40 Id. at 2342.
41 Id. at 2343; see also id. (observing that "between 1993 and 2000, the numbers of Afri-
can-American, Latino, and Native-American students in each class at the Law School varied
from 13.5 to 20.1 percent, a range inconsistent with a quota").
42 Id.
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on any single 'soft' variable," and that the law school did not rely
upon any "mechanical, predetermined diversity 'bonuses' based on
race or ethnicity.'' 4 It also noted that the law school considered
other factors related to "diversity"-not merely an applicant's
race-and that it did not "limit in any way the broad range of
qualities and experiences that may be considered valuable contri-
butions to student body diversity." 44 In fact, the Court claimed
that "the Law School actually gives substantial weight to diversity
factors besides race. 45
The Court further held that before resorting to race-conscious
measures, universities and colleges must examine whether there
are race-neutral alternatives that could have been employed by the
law school in making its admissions decisions. 46 As the Court ob-
43 Id.
44 Id. at 2344; see also id. ("[L]ike the Harvard plan Justice Powell referenced in Bakke,
the Law School's race-conscious admissions program adequately ensures that all factors that
may contribute to student body diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race in admis-
sions decisions").
45 Id.; see also id. ("The Law School frequently accepts nonminority applicants with
grades and test scores lower than underrepresented minority applicants (and other nonminority
applicants) who are rejected.").
46 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (noting that the court
might, for example, ask whether there was "any consideration of the use of race-neutral means")
(quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989)).
A number of amici identified potential race-neutral alternatives that might be employed in-
stead of using racial preferences. See, e.g., Brief of the State of Florida & the Honorable John
Ellis "Jeb" Bush at 3, Grutter (No. 02-241) & Gratz (No. 02-516) ("Florida's experience under
Governor Jeb Bush's One Florida Initiative demonstrates that diversity can be attained through
race-neutral means."); Brief of the Center For New Black Leadership as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 12-13, Grutter (No. 02-241) & Gratz (No. 02-516) (observing that "the
existence of... facially neutral programs establishes, as a matter of law, that less-burdensome
alternatives exist to the use of racial preferences, necessarily rendering respondents' programs
unconstitutional"); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10,
Gruner (No. 02-241) & Gratz (No. 02-516) ("[Tjhere are a variety of race-neutral alternatives
available to achieve the important goals of openness, educational diversity and ensuring that all
students of all races have meaningful access to institutions of higher learning."). But see Brief
of Amicus Curiae Michigan Governor Jennifer M. Granholm et al. at 17, Grutter (No. 02-241)
& Gratz (No. 02-516) (arguing that "the 'percent plan' approach simply does not represent a
viable mechanism for assuring diversity in admissions at the University of Michigan"); Brief of
the National Urban League et al. in Support of Respondents at 3-4, Grutter (No. 02-241) &
Gratz (No. 02-516) (arguing that there are "a battery of ... transparent flaws in the percentage
plans that cast substantial doubt on whether they are efficacious alternatives or even race-neutral
to begin with"); Brief for the United Negro College Fund and Kappa Alpha Psi as Amici Curiae
in Support of Respondents at 25, Grutter (No. 02-241) & Gratz (No. 02-516) ("Although many
race-neutral alternatives have been suggested-and some implemented-none of them have yet
proven effective, and all suffer from serious limitations."); Brief of Harvard University et al. as
Anici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 23, Grutter (No. 02-241) & Gratz (No. 02-516)
("Available research suggests that the impact of [alternative] plans on minority admissions is
quite limited and due in significant part to lingering racial segregation in secondary schools-
itself a deeply problematic state of affairs."); Brief of the American Educational Research Asso-
ciation et al. in Support of Respondents at 4, Grutter (No. 02-241) ("Evidence introduced in the
district court and more recent research studies indicate that race-neutral alternatives are far less
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served, in order for a program to be narrowly tailored, there must
be a "serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral
alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university seeks. 4 7
However, in the case of the law school admissions program, the
Court concluded that all of the race-neutral alternatives such as
lotteries or reducing admissions standards would have required "a
dramatic sacrifice of diversity, the academic quality of all admitted
students, or both. 48
That was not the end of the analysis, however. The Court also
observed that narrow tailoring required that "a race-conscious ad-
missions program not unduly harm members of any racial
group., 49  This is because, as the majority observed, "'there are
serious problems of justice connected with the idea of preference
itself."' 50  Somewhat surprisingly, however, the majority con-
cluded that the law school's admissions program did not impose
such an undue burden. In reaching that conclusion, it pointed to
the law school's use of non-raced-based diversity factors as well as
its individualized consideration of applicants.
Finally, the majority opinion made a somewhat cryptic pro-
nouncement regarding the duration of such programs that has gar-
nered much attention. Observing that "race-conscious admissions
policies must be limited in time," Justice O'Connor stated: "We
expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no
longer be necessary to further the interest approved today. '1
Some have taken this as meaning that the law school's program
must be limited to this specific term of years. Others have taken
this as an indication of a merely aspirational goal.52
Nonetheless, in so stating, the Court appeared to go beyond
mere deference to the law school's decisionmaking. The law
school had proffered no durational limitation on its use of race as a
factor in admissions decisions. 53 Accordingly, under the Court's
effective than race-conscious policies in promoting educational diversity.").
47 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2345.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298).
51 Id. at 2346-47.
52 Justice Ginsburg, for example, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Breyer, viewed
such durational limits as purely aspirational: "From today's vantage point, one may hope, but
not firmly forecast, that over the next generation's span, progress toward nondiscrimination and
genuinely equal opportunity will make it safe to sunset affirmative action." Id. at 2348 (Gins-
burg, J., concurring).
53 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 851 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (observing that
"there is no time limit on defendants' use of race in the admissions process"), rev'd, 288 F.3d
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precedents, its program was constitutionally infirm. 54  For, as Jus-
tice O'Connor observed, racial classifications such as those in-
volved in the law school program were "potentially so dangerous
that they may be employed no more broadly than the interest de-
mands,, 55 and as a result, they "must have a logical end point' 5
6
and must be subject to "sunset provisions" and "periodic reviews
to determine whether racial preferences are still necessary to
achieve student body diversity. 57  Nonetheless, the Court appears
to have supplied some form of durational limitation to save the law
school's program where the law school itself had expressed no
such intent. This goes well beyond any form of "deference" to the
law school's educational judgments.
Indeed, the deference that the Court was willing to give to the
law school was particularly striking in light of the facts found by
the district court in the proceedings below. The district court ruled
732 (6th Cir. 2002); Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 795 (6th Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissent-
ing) ("There is no limiting principle preventing the Law School from employing ethnic or reli-
gious preferences to arrange its student body by critical mass. In short, the compelling state
interest of developing a diverse student body would justify an infinite amount of engineering
with respect to every racial, ethnic, and religious class."), affd, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
54 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 497-98 (1989) (stating
that race-based programs may not be "essentially limitless in scope and duration" and must have
a "logical stopping point") (citation omitted).
Several amici noted that the lack of any durational limitation or "logical stopping point"
rendered the University's program constitutionally infirm. See, e.g., Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9-10, Grutter (No. 02-241) ("[Tlhe Law School's
policy contains no limit on the scope or duration of its racial preferences and the Law School's
approach to admissions would sanction race-based admissions standards indefinitely."); Brief of
the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 22, Grutter (No. 02-241) &
Gratz (No. 02-516) ("There is no 'logical stopping point' for such use of race ...." (quoting
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 676 U.S. 267, 275 (1986)). But see Respondent's Brief at 32,
Grutter (No. 02-241) ("The Law School of course recognizes that race-conscious programs
must have reasonable durational limits, and the Sixth Circuit properly found such a limit in the
Law School's resolve to cease considering race when genuine race-neutral alternatives become
available.").
55 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2346. Justice Ginsburg in a separate concurring opinion inexpli-
cably relied upon principles of international law such as the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination for the same proposition. See id. at 2347
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).
56 Id. at 2346. The majority observed that the law school "concedes that all 'race-
conscious programs must have reasonable durational limits."' Id. (quoting Respondent's Brief
at 32, Grutter (No. 02-241)). Accordingly, despite its application of strict scrutiny to the law
school's admissions program, the majority stated without explanation that it was willing to "take
the Law School at its word that it would 'like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admis-
sions formula' and will terminate its race-conscious admissions program as soon as practicable."
Id. (citation omitted).
57 Id. ("The requirement that all race-conscious admissions programs have a termination
point 'assure[s] all citizens that the deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and
ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the service of the goal of equality it-
self."' (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 510)).
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that the law school's admissions policies amounted to a de facto
quota.58 Nonetheless, the Court apparently concluded that the dis-
trict court's factual determinations did not deserve the same defer-
ence it gave to the law school's decisionmaking. Rather, it glossed
over or ignored the district court's factfinding and instead ceded
that role to school administrators.
Several members of the Court severely criticized the majority
decision on this and other grounds. Justice Scalia, for example,
argued that the law school's "mystical 'critical mass' justification
for its discrimination by race challenges even the most gullible
mind" and that the evidence demonstrated that this rationale was
"a sham to cover a scheme of racially proportionate admissions. 5 9
He also criticized the majority's conclusion that Michigan had a
''compelling interest in maintaining a 'prestige' law school whose
normal admissions standards disproportionately exclude blacks
and other minorities.
60
Most significantly, however, Justice Scalia commented exten-
sively on the vagueness of the Court's holdings in Grutter and
Gratz, observing that the Court's "Grutter-Gratz split double
header seems perversely designed to prolong the controversy and
the litigation., 61 According to Justice Scalia, the majority opinions
in the two cases left several open questions that would undoubt-
edly be the subject of "future lawsuits." Thus, for example, Justice
Scalia suggested that litigants might question whether an admis-
sions program contained enough "individual" evaluation of appli-
cants, avoided "separate admissions tracks," sought to achieve a
"critical mass" of minority students rather than a "de facto quota
system," and was based on a real commitment to diversity. Simi-
larly, future courts would be called upon to resolve whether the
program at issue intentionally discriminated against certain minor-
ity groups in order to achieve a "generic minority 'critical mass,"'
58 The district court observed:
[B]y using race to ensure the enrollment of a certain minimum percentage of under-
represented minority students, the law school has made the current admissions policy
practically indistinguishable from a quota system .... [T]he law school has an un-
written policy of constituting each entering class so that at least 10-12% are students
from underrepresented minority groups .... The practical effect of the law school's
policy is indistinguishable from a straight quota system, and such a system is not nar-
rowly tailored under any interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 851. But see Grutter, 288 F.3d at 747-48 ("As a matter of defini-
tion, we are satisfied that the Law School's 'critical mass' is not the equivalent of a quota,
because.., the Law School has no fixed goal or target.").
59 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2348 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60 Id. at 2349.
61 Id.
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and whether the racial preferences at issue "have gone below or
above the mystical Grutter-approved 'critical mass."' 6 z
Justice Thomas similarly raised a number of problems in the
majority's analysis. Justice Thomas concluded that, on its face,
the law school's admissions policy constituted constitutionally-
prohibited racial discrimination.63 As he observed: "No one would
argue that a university could set up a lower general admission
standard and then impose heightened requirements only on black
applicants. Similarly, a university may not maintain a high admis-
sion standard and grant exemptions to favored races." 64
Second, he critiqued the majority's "unprecedented deference"
to the law school's decisionmaking, which he concluded was "an
approach inconsistent with the very concept of 'strict scrutiny. ' ' 65
According to Justice Thomas, "under strict scrutiny, the Law
School's assessment of the benefits of racial discrimination and
devotion to the admissions status quo are not entitled to any sort of
deference, grounded in the First Amendment or anywhere else. 66
Third, Justice Thomas concluded that the need for "diversity"
was not a sufficiently compelling interest to withstand strict scru-
tiny. In particular, Justice Thomas relied heavily upon the Court's
decision in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,67 which held
that the desire to have a racially diverse teaching faculty was not a
sufficiently compelling state interest to support a collective bar-
gaining agreement for teachers that favored certain minority
races. 68 Justice Thomas noted that the Court in Wygant had spe-
cifically stated that "'[s]ocietal discrimination, without more, is
too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy'
because a 'court could uphold remedies that are ageless in their
reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the fu-
ture.' ' 69  In his view, the law school's admissions program ap-
62 Id. at 2349-50.
63 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
64 Id. at 2350; see also id. ("The Law School, of its own choosing, and for its own pur-
poses, maintains an exclusionary admissions system that it knows produces racially dispropor-
tionate results. Racial discrimination is not a permissible solution to the self-inflicted wounds of
this elitist admissions policy.").
65 Id.
66 Id. at 2356; see also id. at 2357 ('The majority's broad deference to both the Law
School's judgment that racial aesthetics leads to educational benefits and its stubborn refusal to
alter the status quo in admissions methods finds no basis in the Constitution or decisions of this
Court.").
67 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
68 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2351.
69 Id. at 2352 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276); see also id. (observing that "[tihe Con-
stitution abhors classifications based on race, not only because those classifications can harm
favored races or are based on illegitimate motives, but also because every time the government
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1
peared to be an attempt to compensate for such generalized dis-
crimination.
Justice Thomas further critiqued the majority's analysis of the
compelling interest at issue in the case. As Justice Thomas ob-
served, the law school was pursuing "diversity" in admissions
based on a desire to attain certain "educational benefits." As had
Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas noted that the law school refused to
obtain these alleged benefits by dropping its admissions standards
so that a greater number of minority candidates would be deemed
"qualified." Therefore, in reality the specific interest at issue, ac-
cording to Justice Thomas, was "the Law School's interest in of-
fering a marginally superior education while maintaining an elite
,,70institution.
Justice Thomas concluded that this interest was even less
"compelling" than the interest in remedying societal discrimination
through diversity programs that the Court rejected in Wygant. As
he observed: "Under the proper standard, there is no pressing pub-
lic necessity in maintaining a public law school at all and, it fol-
lows, certainly not an elite law school.' Indeed, as Justice Tho-
places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or bene-
fits, it demeans us all").
70 Id. at 2353; see also id. at 2353 n.4 ("If the Law School is correct that the educational
benefits of 'diversity' are so great, then achieving them by altering admissions standards should
not compromise its elite status. The Law School's reluctance to do this suggests that the educa-
tional benefits it alleges are not significant or do not exist at all.").
Several amici submitted evidence showing that there were no demonstrable benefits flow-
ing from a diverse student body. See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae National Association of
Scholars in Support of Petitioners at 6, Grutter (No. 02-241) (concluding that "the premise that
faculty view racial preferences as essential to the basic purposes of higher education, or even as
desirable, is unfounded"); Brief Amicus Curiae of Reason Foundation in Support of Petitioners
at 10, Grutter (No. 02-241) & Gratz (No. 02-516) (concluding that "academic outcomes 'are
generally not affected' by racial composition of the peer environments and measures of minority
enrollment, and that any effects found 'are very weak and indirect"'). But see Brief Amicus
Curiae of the National Education Association et al. at 24, Grutter (No. 02-241) & Gratz (No.
02-516) ("[S]upport for the proposition that integration itself yields educational benefits is
found in the voluminous social science literature analyzing the impact of school desegregation
on student performance."); Brief of Amici Curiae American Council on Education and 52 Other
Higher Education Organizations in Support of Respondents at 27-28, Grutter (No. 02-241)
("Research... shows that institutional commitment to diversity is linked with student academic
success and relatively low racial tension on campus supports retention of minority students and,
overall, has powerful educational impact on white and minority students.") (citations omitted).
71 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2354 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Jus-
tice Thomas further noted that this interest was even less compelling given that most of the
graduates of the law school did not even remain in the State of Michigan. See id. at 2355
(cataloguing evidence demonstrating that "the Law School trains few Michigan residents and
overwhelmingly serves students, who, as lawyers, leave the State of Michigan" and concluding
that "[tihe Law School's decision to be an elite institution does little to advance the welfare of
the people of Michigan or any cognizable interest of the State of Michigan").
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mas observed, "[t]he interest in remaining elite and
exclusive . . . requires the use of admissions 'standards' that, in
turn, create the Law School's 'need' to discriminate on the basis of
race."
72
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion similarly main-
tained that the law school's admissions policy was not narrowly
tailored. Rather, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the law
school had engaged in "a naked effort to achieve racial balanc-
ing. 73 Finally, as did Justices Scalia and Thomas, the Chief Jus-
tice observed that the Court's application of strict scrutiny was
"unprecedented in its deference., 74
In examining the law school's admissions program, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist concluded that it "bears little or no relation to its
asserted goal of achieving 'critical mass."'75  He cited the large
disparities among various underrepresented minority groups in
terms of admission to the law school, noting:
In order for this pattern of admission to be consistent with the
Law School's explanation of "critical mass," one would have
to believe that the objectives of "critical mass" offered by re-
spondents are achieved with only half the number of Hispan-
ics and one-sixth the number of Native Americans as com-
pared to African-Americans.76
Chief Justice Rehnquist attributed these results to outright racial
balancing, noting that "from 1995 through 2000 the percentage of
admitted applicants who were members of these minority groups
closely tracked the percentage of individuals in the school's appli-
cant pool who were from the same groups., 77 Thus, in Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's view, the admissions policies constituted "a care-
fully managed program designed to ensure proportionate represen-
tation of applicants from selected minority groups. 78
As Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion forcefully demonstrates,
the majority's prohibition of "racial balancing" and discriminatory
practices within the underrepresented minority and remaining
72 Id. at 2356.
73 Id. at 2365 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
74 Id. at 2366.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 2367; see also id. (observing that the majority "simply emphasize[s] the impor-
tance of achieving 'critical mass,' without any explanation of why that concept is applied differ-
ently among the three underrepresented groups").
77 Id. at 2368.
78 Id. at 2369.
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segments of the applicant population leave such affirmative action
programs open to significant collateral attack. For the way in
which these programs are implemented, as evidenced in the law
school case, shows that there is significant discrimination among
different "underrepresented" minority groups as well as among
"overrepresented" groups such as white and Asian students. Thus,
future lawsuits may seek to undermine these programs by chal-
lenging the significant preferences given to African-American stu-
dents over Hispanic students, or the discriminatory effects of these
programs on Asian applicants.
Chief Justice Rehnquist further concluded that the law school's
admissions program failed the constitutional test because it was
effectively of unlimited duration. He found that the law school's
"discussions of a time limit are the vaguest of assurances," and as
a result "permit[ted] the Law School's use of racial preferences on
a seemingly permanent basis.",79 Thus, unlike the majority, he was
unwilling to supply the law school with a durational limit that was
contrary to its expressed intent.
Finally, Justice Kennedy filed a separate dissent in which he
asserted that "[t]he Court . . .does not apply strict scrutiny" and
that, "[b]y trying to say otherwise, it undermines both the test and
its own controlling precedents., 80 According to Justice Kennedy,
"[h]aving approved the use of race as a factor in the admissions
process, the majority proceeds to nullify the essential safeguard
Justice Powell insisted upon [in Bakke] as the precondition of the
approval. The safeguard was rigorous judicial review, with strict
scrutiny as the controlling standard.'
Justice Kennedy indicated that while the Court might give def-
erence to a "university's definition of its educational objective,"
deference "is not to be given with respect to the methods by which
it is pursued. 82  Justice Kennedy pointed to Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion, which he maintained "demonstrates beyond
question why the concept of critical mass is a delusion used by the
Law School to mask its attempt to make race an automatic factor
in most instances and to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable
from quotas.,
83
79 Id. at 2370.
80 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
81 Id.; see also id. (observing that "[t]his Court has reaffirmed, subsequent to Bakke, the
absolute necessity of strict scrutiny when the state uses race as an operative category").
82 Id. at 2370-71.
83 Id. at 2371. Several amici made the point that the law school's attempt to create a "criti-
cal mass" of underrepresented minority students constituted a de facto or "disguised" quota.
See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9, Grutter (No.
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Specifically, Justice Kennedy noted that race was "outcome de-
terminative" in filling fifteen to twenty percent of the available
admissions slots. The percentage of minorities enrolled at the law
school "fluctuated only by 0.3%, from 13.5% to 13.8%," and the
"number of minority students to whom offers were extended varied
by just a slightly greater magnitude of 2.2%." 84  Justice Kennedy
noted that the district court had concluded based on this evidence
that the "Law School's pursuit of critical mass mutated into the
equivalent of a quota., 85 As a result, there was a lack of individual
review, which the majority deemed necessary for an admissions
program to withstand constitutional scrutiny. 86
02-241) ("[R]espondents' admissions policy uses disguised quotas to ensure that each entering
class includes a predetermined 'critical mass' of certain racial minorities."); Brief of Amici
Curiae Law Professors Larry Alexander et al. in Support of Petitioner at 9, Grutter (No. 02-241)
("'Diversity' policies must be described as what they are-means of implementing racial quo-
tas."); Brief of Amicus Curiae Center for Individual Freedom in Support of Petitioners at 3,
Grutter (No. 02-241) & Gratz (No. 02-516) ("[Tlhe admitted desire for a 'critical mass' of
supposedly under-represented minority students is an open admission of the existence of a
quota."); Brief Amici Curiae of the Center for Equal Opportunity et al. at 11, Grutter (No. 02-
241) & Gratz (No. 02-516) ("In this case, as found by the district court, the Law School uses
racial preferences in its admissions process to achieve a minimum ten-percent minority repre-
sentation within its student body that is 'practically indistinguishable from a quota system."'
(quoting Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 851)). But see Respondent's Brief at 38, Grutter (No. 02-
241) ("Petitioner and her amici repeatedly charge that the Law School's admissions process
employs a 'quota' or 'effectively reserves' a minimum of 10-12% of the class for minority
applicants. That accusation may be an error of law or of fact (their arguments are too vague to
discern which), but either way the error is a plain one."); Brief of the Law School Admission
Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 22, Grutter (No. 02-241) ("It is pre-
cisely the flexibility afforded admissions officials that distinguishes most race-sensitive law
school admissions policies from the 'quota' system condemned in Bakke."); Brief of Amicus
Curiae Michigan Black Law Alumni Society in Support of Respondents at 5, Grutter (No. 02-
241) (maintaining that "the Law School admissions policy does not erect a quota, and its central
goal is to select students who will become outstanding lawyers").
94 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2371 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
85 Id.; see also id. (acknowledging that "there were greater fluctuations among enrolled
minorities in the preceding years, 1987-1994, by as much as 5 or 6%"). As did the other dis-
senting members of the Court, Justice Kennedy commented on the majority's strange forecast
that the law school would not employ such programs 25 years from now:
It is difficult to assess the Court's pronouncement that race-conscious admissions
programs will be unnecessary 25 years from now .... If it is intended to mitigate
the damage the Court does to the concept of strict scrutiny, neither petitioners nor
other rejected law school applicants will find solace in knowing the basic protection
put in place by Justice Powell will be suspended for a full quarter of a century. Def-
erence is antithetical to strict scrutiny, not consistent with it.
Id. at 2373. He further noted that "[i]f universities are given the latitude to administer programs
that are tantamount to quotas, they will have few incentives to make the existing minority ad-
missions schemes transparent and protective of individual review." Id. at 2374.
86 Justice Kennedy noted that there was substantive evidence that individual review was in
fact not implemented in the admissions process. For example:
[t]he consultation of daily reports during the last stages in the admissions process
suggests there was no further attempt at individual review save for race itself. The
admissions officers could use the reports to recalibrate the plus factor given to race
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Justice Kennedy's dissent best illustrates how the majority
opinion ignores the record at issue in the case. The actual facts asfound by the district court below show that the University ofMichigan's efforts to achieve a "critical mass" amounted to a defacto quota. Moreover, in the process of achieving a critical mass,
the law school was forced to discriminate among members of dif-ferent underrepresented minority groups. Finally, there was sig-
nificant evidence that law school administrators had engaged in apurposeful attempt to achieve a prohibited racial balance among
admitted students. All of these facts were glossed over by the ma-jority.
The majority's decision in Grutter was therefore subject topowerful critiques by the dissenting members of the Court. Its
announcement of a rule of "deference" while at the same time ap-plying strict scrutiny was particularly controversial. To a lesser
extent, its adoption of Justice Powell's analysis in Bakke was also
subject to criticism. Finally, the Court appeared to ignore the sig-
nificant evidence that the law school's goal of a "critical mass" of
underrepresented minority students functioned as a defacto quota.
B. Gratz v. Bollinger
The Court was far more united in its review of the University
of Michigan's undergraduate admissions program in Gratz. Whilethe University had changed its guidelines "a number of times, 87 it
consistently considered race as one of the factors in its admissionsdecisions.88 The use of race in admissions was so pervasive thatthe University admitted "virtually every qualified ...applicant"
who was a member of certain "underrepresented minorities. 89
An applicant's race had additional ramifications, however.Under the University's guidelines, members of certain groups wereto be "admitted as soon as possible in light of the University's be-lief that such applicants were more likely to enroll if promptly no-
depending on how close they were to achieving the Law School's goal of critical
mass.
Id. at 2372.
87 Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 (2003).
9s See id. at 2418-19 (observing that, aside from race, the university also "considers anumber of factors in making admissions decisions, including high school grades, standardizedtest scores, high school quality, curriculum strength, geography, alumni relationships, andleadership").
89 Id. at 2419; see also id. (noting that "underrepresented minorities" include "African-Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans").
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tified of their admission. ' 9° The University also had certain "pro-
tected seats" that were available only to specific groups, "includ-
ing athletes, foreign students, ROTC candidates, and underrepre-
sented minorities." 9' As had the law school, the University sought
to justify these measures on the grounds that it had a compelling
interest in achieving the educational benefits flowing from a "di-
verse" student body.92
The six-member majority opinion authored by Chief Justice
Rehnquist pointed to the Court's decision in Grutter in rejecting
the petitioners' attempt to argue that the desire to achieve "diver-
sity" could not be used as a justification for the use of race in uni-
versity admissions.93 It then proceeded, however, to consider
whether the University of Michigan program was narrowly tailored
94to achieve such an interest, ultimately concluding that it did not
give the "individualized consideration" to applicants that was con-
stitutionally required.95
The undergraduate program, unlike the law school admissions
program, automatically gave "20 points, or one-fifth of the points
needed to guarantee admission, to every single 'underrepresented
minority' applicant solely because of race." 96  The Court deter-
mined that this mechanical point system was "not narrowly tai-
lored to achieve the interest in educational diversity. 97
As did the majority in Grutter, the majority in Gratz applied
Justice Powell's analysis in Bakke. The majority noted that Justice
Powell's opinion "emphasized the importance of considering each
particular applicant as an individual, assessing all of the qualities
that individual possesses, and in turn, evaluating that individual's
ability to contribute to the unique setting of higher education., 98
The undergraduate admissions program failed this test because it
did not give each applicant individualized consideration since it
"automatically distribute[d] 20 points to every single applicant
from an 'underrepresented minority' group, as defined by the Uni-
90 Id. at 2420.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 2426-27.
94 Id. at 2427-28.
95 Id. at 2428.
96 Id. at 2427.
97 Id.; see also Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1254-57 (11 th
Cir. 2001) (striking down "rigid, mechanical approach to considering race," which was "itself
incompatible with the need for flexibility in the admissions process").
98 Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2428; see also id. ("[U]nder the approach Justice Powell described,
each characteristic of a particular applicant was to be considered in assessing the applicant's
entire application.").
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versity." 99 Indeed, the applicant's race was weighted so heavily
that it was the "decisive" factor for "virtually every minimally
qualified underrepresented minority applicant.10'
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate concurring opinion in which
she agreed that the undergraduate admissions program did not
"provide for a meaningful individualized review of applicants."'' °
In her view, the "mechanized selection index score" used by the
undergraduate admissions staff, which "by and large, automati-
cally determines the admissions decision for each applicant," pre-
cluded the "type of individualized consideration" that Grutter re-
quired. 1
02
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Thomas reiterated the
view he expressed in Grutter that "a State's use of racial discrimi-
nation in higher education admissions is categorically prohibited
by the Equal Protection Clause." 03  Justice Thomas noted, how-
ever, that the undergraduate admissions program did not discrimi-
nate among applicants that were members of different underrepre-
sented minority groups.' 0" Rather, the program treated all under-
represented minorities equally, giving them all an additional
twenty points. °5  Nonetheless, the program was still defective in
that it did not consider "nonracial distinctions among applicants on
both sides of the single permitted racial classification."
Justice Souter, in contrast, filed a dissenting opinion arguing
that the undergraduate admissions policy was similar to the law
school admissions policy upheld in Grutter.Y He concluded that
99 Id.
100 Id.
1011 d. at 2431 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at 2432 ("[Tlhe selection index, by
setting up automatic, predetermined point allocations for the soft variables, ensures that the
diversity contributions of applicants cannot be individually assessed.").
02 Id. at 2431. Justice O'Connor observed that the points awarded for underrepresented
minority status far outstripped points awarded for other factors:
Michigan residents, for example, receive 10 points, and children of alumni receive 4.
Counselors may assign an outstanding essay up to 3 points and may award up to 5
points for an applicant's personal achievement, leadership, or public service .... Al-
though the Office of Undergraduate Admissions does assign 20 points to some "soft"
variables other than race, the points available for other diversity contributions, such
as leadership and service, personal achievement, and geographic diversity, are
capped at much lower levels. Even the most outstanding national high school leader
could never receive more than five points for his or her accomplishments-a mere
quarter of the points automatically assigned to an underrepresented minority solely
based on the fact of his or her race.
Id. at 2431-32.
103 Id. at 2433 (Thomas, J., concurring).
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 See id. at 2440 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that Gratz is "closer to what Grutter ap-
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the undergraduate admissions program did not implement a quota
system, such as that invalidated in the Bakke case, noting that the
program considered a number of factors other than race."°8 In Jus-
tice Souter's opinion, the undergraduate program was therefore
constitutional because it considered "'all pertinent elements of
diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant"'
and placed "each element 'on the same footing for consideration,
although not necessarily according them the same weight."" ' 9
While he acknowledged that there might be a point system
where the racial "plus factor" was "so extreme as to guarantee
every minority applicant a higher rank than every nonminority
applicant in the university's admissions system," he concluded that
the undergraduate program at issue in Gratz did not pose such a
case."0 Indeed, Justice Souter observed that "[t]he college simply
does bya numbered scale what the law school accomplishes in its
'holistic review."' I
Justice Ginsburg also issued a dissenting opinion. She main-
tained that the government in evaluating race-conscious programs
could permissibly "distinguish between policies of exclusion and
inclusion."' 2  She reasoned that "[a]ctions designed to burden
groups long denied full citizenship stature are not sensibly ranked
with measures taken to hasten the day when entrenched discrimi-
nation and its after effects have been extirpated."'" 13
Citing the "United Nations-initiated" Conventions on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Jus-
tice Ginsburg observed that "[c]ontemporary human rights docu-
ments draw just this line; they distinguish between policies of op-
pression and measures designed to accelerate de facto equality.""i
Accordingly, she determined that the undergraduate admissions
program survived judicial scrutiny because it was a policy of "in-
clusion" that sought to benefit disadvantaged minorities.
proves than to what Bakke condemns").
108 See id. (observing that the plan lets all applicants "compete for all places and values an
applicant's offering for any place not only on grounds of race, but on grades, test scores,
strength of high school, quality of course of study, residence, alumni relationships, leadership,
personal character, socioeconomic disadvantage, athletic ability, and quality of a personal es-
say").
l 9 Id. at 2440 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317).
1Old. at 2441.
I Id. (quoting Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2343).
1121d. at 2444 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
"31d.
1
4 Id. at 2445.
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Finally, in a somewhat unusual line of reasoning, Justice Gins-
burg further argued that "colleges and universities will seek to
maintain their minority enrollment" despite the Court's invalida-
tion of policies such as that employed by the undergraduate pro-
gram and that they would resort to "camouflage" in order to
achieve this end. 1 5 Accordingly, Justice Ginsburg reasoned that
the undergraduate program should be upheld because "[i]f honesty
is the best policy, surely Michigan's accurately described, fully
disclosed College affirmative action program is preferable to
achieving similar numbers through winks, nods, and disguises."
116
Despite these dissents, however, the Court was far more uni-
fied in its decision in Gratz than it had been in Grutter. Nonethe-
less, it is difficult to reconcile the two decisions. In Gratz, the
Court appeared to be troubled by the mechanistic approach in the
consideration of race in admissions decisions that resulted in a lack
of "individualized consideration." Yet, it is difficult to see why
this could be constitutionally significant or outcome determinative.
If race may be considered as a "plus factor," whether such consid-
eration is "mechanical" or "individualized" should not seem to
matter.
II. AN ORIGINALIST APPROACH
The most striking aspect of the opinions in Grutter and Gratz
is that none discuss in detail the original meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Rather, the Court focused primarily on its
own precedents in cases such as Bakke, Croson, and Adarand. In
the process, however, a majority of the Court announced new doc-
trines designed to uphold affirmative action programs in the educa-
tional context while at the same time making clear that not all such
programs that seek to obtain the "educational benefits" of "diver-
sity" are necessarily constitutional. The result of these various
forces shaping the Court's decisionmaking is a pair of decisions
that are difficult to reconcile.
An originalist analysis has the potential to provide greater clar-
ity concerning the constitutionality of state-sponsored affirmative
action programs. While the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
did not directly address the question, the fundamental principles
they sought to embody in the amendment may give some guidance
115 Id. at 2446.
16 Id. Several members of the Court also concluded that the petitioners lacked standing to
seek prospective relief regarding the undergraduate admissions policies given that they were not
likely to suffer any injury from those policies in the future. See id. at 2434-38 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). However, the majority rejected this conclusion. See id. at 2422-26.
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in resolving this modern controversy. Indeed, originalist argu-
ments can be constructed on both sides of this question.
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."' 17 Thus, there are three clauses that
are potentially applicable in determining whether state-sponsored
affirmative action programs are constitutional.
At the outset, the Due Process Clause does not appear to be
particularly relevant given that it was most likely intended to guar-
antee procedural, as opposed to substantive, rights. 1 8 In contrast,
despite the fact that the Supreme Court narrowly construed the
clause in The Slaughter-House Cases, 119 the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause of the amendment provides a potential source of sub-
stantive rights that may be adversely impacted by state-sponsored
affirmative action programs. Finally, and most obviously, the
Equal Protection Clause must be considered in determining
whether such programs impermissibly discriminate against certain
classes of individuals.
A. The Privileges or Immunities Clause
The Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides a potential, albeit judicially ig-
nored, source for a constitutional prohibition of discrimination.
That clause provides that "[n]o State shall . . . abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States."' 2° Thus, the
clause by its terms applies only to citizens.' 2' It does not apply to
117U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
118 See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 6, at 222 (maintaining that due process did "not compre-
hend judicial power to override legislation on substantive or policy grounds").
11983 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). See also AMAR, supra note 6, at 213 (observing that the
Court's ruling "strangl[ed] the privileges-or-immunities clause in its crib"); PERRY, supra note
6, at 89 ("[An early misreading by the Court of the privileges or immunities provision yielded a
privileges or immunities norm that was largely useless."); Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the
Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising the Slaughter-House Cases Without Exhuming
Lochner: Individual Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REV. 1, 1 (1996) ("The
decision in the Slaughter-House Cases liquidated the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."); Sanford Levinson, Some Reflections on the Rehabilitation of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71,
73 (1989) (stating that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was "ruthlessly eviscerated" by the
Slaughter-House Court).
120U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
121 This distinction is part of a broader conceptual framework that served as the backdrop
for nineteenth-century notions of fundamental law. Indeed, "nineteenth-century American law
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all "persons" as do the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.
In order to determine the scope of the guarantee under the
clause it is necessary to determine the original meaning of the
terms "privileges" and "immunities" at the time of ratification. An
analysis of the historical record shows that the privileges and im-
munities of citizens were those fundamental capacities thought to
be inherent in citizenship. 122  During the congressional debates
over the amendment, Representative Woodbridge stated, for ex-
ample, that it was intended to "give to a citizen of the United
States the natural rights which necessarily pertain to citizen-
ship."'
123
These capacities or powers were conceived of as existing ante-
rior to the establishment of government. Citizens had a fundamen-
tal right to exercise certain powers on the basis of their status as
citizens as well as fundamental rights available to all persons.2
4
They had the power, for example, to own property, to testify, and
to enforce their rights in the courts. These were all aspects of citi-
zenship that were specifically guaranteed in the Civil Rights
Act, 125 which Congress sought to constitutionalize by enacting
frequently distinguished between the rights of citizens and the rights of noncitizens, principally
aliens." Harrison, supra note 6, at 1390.
122 See, e.g., John Harrison, If the Eye Offend Thee, Turn Off the Color, 91 MICH. L. REV.
1213, 1230 (1993) ("[Tlhe privileges and immunities of citizens referred to in the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, although they encompass basic rights, like making contracts and owning
property, were not generally understood as including all rights someone might have."); Robert J.
Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 926 (1986) ("The framers' understanding of citizenship involved an
important distinction between fundamental and nonfundamental rights."); Earl M. Maltz, The
Fourteenth Amendment as Political Compromise-Section One in the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 933, 967 (1984) ("While some construed the term civil rights
very broadly, all mainstream Republicans agreed that the privileges and immunities encom-
passed only those interests which are 'fundamental."').
123 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1 st Sess. 1088 (1866) (statement of Rep. Woodbridge).
124See, e.g., id. (statement of Rep. Woodbridge) ("What is the object of the proposed
amendment? It merely gives the power to Congress to enact those laws which will give to a
citizen of the United States the natural rights which necessarily pertain to citizenship."); id. at
1836 (statement of Rep. Lawrence) (maintaining that "[firom the very nature of citizenship, the
avowed purpose of the founders of our Government, and the interpretation put upon the Consti-
tution, it must be clear that this bill creates no new right, confers no new privilege, but is de-
claratory of what is already the constitutional rights of every citizen in every State" and, that
"equality of civil rights is the fundamental rule that pervades the Constitution and controls all
State authority").
125 Section One of the Act provided that citizens would have the "same right" to exercise
certain fundamental rights:
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, ex-
cluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and
such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of
slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right ... to make and enforce
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Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1
26
In contrast, the clause did not afford protection for "special
privileges," which could only exist after a government was estab-
lished. Thus, Representative Wilson in discussing the nature of
the rights to be guaranteed under the Civil Rights Act indicated
that "[c]ivil rights are those which have no relation to the estab-
lishment, support, or management of government."'' 27  Similarly,
contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property .... and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982).
126 Several members of Congress indicated that the amendment was designed to constitu-
tionalize the Civil Rights Act. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2502 (1866)
(statement of Rep. Raymond) ("[A]lthough [the Civil Rights Bill] became a law and is now
upon our statute-book, it is again proposed so to amend the Constitution as to confer upon
Congress the power to pass it."); id. at 2896 (statement of Sen. Doolittle) (maintaining that "it
was because Mr. BINGHAM and others of the House of Representatives and other persons upon
the committee had doubts, at least, as to the constitutionality of the civil rights bill that this
proposition to amend the Constitution now appears to give it validity and force"); id. at 2511
(statement of Rep. Eliot) ("I voted for the civil rights bill, and I did so under a conviction that
we have ample power to enact into law the provisions of that bill. But I shall gladly do what I
may to incorporate into the Constitution provisions which will settle the doubt" as to the bill's
constitutionality.).
Moreover, members of Congress described the rights enumerated in the Act as the "rights
of citizenship." See, e.g., id. at 1833 (statement of Rep. Lawrence); id. at 1152 (noting that the
Act was designed to protect "the fundamental rights of citizenship; those rights which constitute
the essence of freedom"); see also BERGER, supra note 6, at 30 ("The 'privileges or immunities'
clause was the central provision of the Amendment's § I, and the key to its meaning is furnished
by the immediately preceding Civil Rights Act of 1866, which, all are agreed, it was the purpose
of the Amendment to embody and protect."); CURTIS, supra note 6, at 86 ("Several congress-
men observed that the amendment would eliminate any question about the power of Congress to
pass the Civil Rights bill. Others considered the amendment a reiteration of the Civil Rights
bill.").
Justice Field in his dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases similarly pointed to the Civil
Rights Act as providing an enumeration of the privileges and immunities of citizens:
What, then, are the privileges and immunities which are secured against abridgement
by State legislation? In the first section of the Civil Rights Act Congress has given
its interpretation to these terms, or at least has stated some of the rights which, in its
judgment these terms include; it has there declared that they include the right "to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties and give evidence, to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit
of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property."
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 96-97 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting).
127 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson); see also id.
at 1119 (statement of Rep. Lawrence) (maintaining that "[b]efore our Constitution was formed,
the great fundamental rights which I have mentioned, belonged to every person who became a
member of our great national family" and that the "several departments of Government possess
the power to enact, administer, and enforce the laws 'necessary and proper' to secure these
rights which existed anterior to the ordination of the Constitution"). See generally Paul v.
Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180-81 (1868) (observing that "[sipecial privileges enjoyed by
citizens in their own States are not secured in other States" under the clause).
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the framers of the amendment specifically stated that it would not
guarantee the right to vote or to hold office. 28 This was part of a
broader conceptual framework that viewed such "political" rights
as not being inherent in the concept of citizenship. 29 Indeed, the
Fifteenth Amendment was soon ratified as a separate constitutional
measure to specifically guarantee at least one such "political"
right-the right to vote.
1 30
As a consequence, the Privileges or Immunities Clause as
originally understood does not provide any constitutional guaran-
tee with respect to rights that could only exist after the establish-
ment of government. By implication, therefore, the clause does
not provide any constitutional guarantee with respect to benefits
conferred by the government. For such benefits may only exist
after a government is established.
Under this construction, government educational benefits
would not fall within the scope of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a result, state govern-
128 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard)
("The right of suffrage is not, in law, one of the privileges or immunities thus secured by the
Constitution. It is merely the creature of law. It has always been regarded in this country as the
result of positive local law ...."); see also NELSON, supra note 6, at 125 ("The statement most
frequently made in debates on the Fourteenth Amendment is that it did not, in and of itself,
confer upon blacks or anyone else the right to vote.").
Members of Congress similarly distinguished between civil and political rights in debating
the Civil Rights Act. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1757 (1866) (statement of
Sen. Trumbull) ("[T]he granting of civil rights does not, and never did in this country, carry
with it rights, or, more properly speaking, political privileges. A man may be a citizen in this
country without a right to vote or without a right to hold office."); id. at 1255 (statement of Sen.
Wilson) ("I [believe] Congress is clothed with ample authority to secure the emancipated slaves
in their civil rights and immunities. But I did not understand then, and I do not believe now,
that it gives Congress the power to clothe these men with suffrage or to confer office upon
them."); id. at 1117 (statement of Rep. Wilson) (maintaining that the terms "civil rights and
immunities" used in the Civil Rights Bill did not "mean that in all things civil, social, political,
all citizens, without distinction of race or color, shall be equal"); id. at 1151 (statement of Rep.
Thayer) ("[N]obody can successfully contend that a bill guarantying simply civil rights and
immunities is a bill under which you could extend the right of suffrage, which is a political
privilege and not a civil right.").
129 See Harrison, supra note 6, at 1417 ("[N]ineteenth-century usage concerning political
participation confirms the close connection between privileges and immunities and civil rights:
neither was thought to extend to political rights, such as voting or serving on juries."); Maltz,
supra note 122, at 965 (observing that "1860 Americans distinguished two mutually exclusive
sets of rights: 'civil rights'-rights which belong to all men as a matter of natural law-and
'political rights'-rights which are granted by the grace of government"); McConnell, supra
note 6, at 1024 ("It was generally understood that the nondiscrimination requirement of the
Fourteenth Amendment applied only to 'civil rights.' Political and social rights, it was agreed,
were not civil rights and were not protected.").
1
30 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV. See also AMAR, supra note 6, at 273 (observing that "the
Fifteenth Amendment, rightly read, affirms blacks' political rights-to vote, serve on juries, and
hold office-just as the Fourteenth Amendment had affirmed blacks' civil rights to do virtually
everything but").
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ments or universities would remain free to adopt whatever educa-
tional policies they deemed appropriate, including admissions
policies that discriminated on the basis of applicants' race by giv-
ing certain racial categories a "plus" factor in making admissions
decisions.
This interpretation finds some support in the Court's jurispru-
dence under the related Privileges and Immunities Clause of Arti-
cle IV, Section 2. That clause provides that "[t]he Citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens
in the several States."''3  The framers of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment specifically acknowledged that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV served as the basis for the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause of Section One. Representative Bingham, the
primary draftsman of the amendment, stated, for example, that it
would give Congress the power "to protect by national law the
privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic and
the inborn rights of every person within its jurisdiction whenever
the same shall be abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of
any State."' 132  Similarly, Senator Howard in introducing the pro-
posed amendment, cited the Article IV clause as authority in defin-
ing the meaning of the terms "privileges" and "immunities. ' 33
Finally, other members of Congress referred to the Article IV
clause more generally as a potential source of a constitutional
guarantee of civil rights that were being abridged in the South. 1
34
131 U.S. CONST. Art. IV, § 2.
132 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1 st Sess. 2542 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
133Id. at 2765 (statement of Sen. Howard); see also id. at 2961 (statement of Sen. Poland)
(stating that the Privileges or Immunities Clause "secures nothing beyond what was intended by
the original provision in the Constitution, that 'the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States"'); id. at 1088 (statement of Rep.
Woodbridge) (observing that the proposed amendment "is intended to enable Congress by its
enactments when necessary to give to a citizen of the United States, in whatever State he may
be, those privileges and immunities which are guarantied to him under the Constitution of the
United States"); id. at 1089 (statement of Rep. Bingham) (maintaining that the states could not
"withhold from any citizen of the United States within its limits, under any pretext whatever,
any of the privileges of a citizen of the United States" or impose "any burden contrary to that
provision of the Constitution which declares that the citizen shall be entitled in the several States
to all the immunities of a citizen of the United States").
134 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1836 (1866) (statement of Rep. Law-
rence) ('This clause of the Constitution therefore recognizes but one kind of fundamental civil
privileges equal for all citizens. No sophistry can change it, no logic destroy its force. There it
stands, the palladium of equal fundamental civil rights for all citizens."); id. at 1118 (statement
of Rep. Wilson) ("If [the States] would recognize that 'general citizenship' (Story on the Consti-
tution, volume two, page 604) which under this clause entitles every citizen to security and
protection of personal rights, (Campbell vs. Morris, 3 Harris & McHenry, 535) we might safely
withhold action."); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 193 (1865) (statement of Rep. Kasson)
("[lIt is necessary to carry into effect [the Privileges and Immunities Clause] of the Constitution
of the United States which has been disobeyed in nearly every slave State of the Union for some
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Beginning with Justice Bushrod Washington's often-cited
opinion in Corfield v. Coryell,135 which pre-dated the Fourteenth
Amendment and was expressly cited by its framers, the "privi-
leges" and "immunities" contemplated under the clause were con-
strued to be those "which are, in their nature, fundamental; which
belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which
have, at all times been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states
which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free,
independent, and sovereign."'
136
Similarly, despite recent erosion of this interpretation of the
Article IV clause, some of the Court's modern cases have reiter-
ated the limited nature of the provision. Thus, in Baldwin v. Mon-
tana Fish & Game Commission, 37 the Court considered whether a
state could impose a licensing fee that discriminated against non-
residents who wanted to hunt game in the state. The Court upheld
the licensing fee despite the Privileges and Immunities Clause
challenge on the ground that the clause protected only those rights
that were "fundamental," noting: "Whatever rights or activities
may be 'fundamental' under the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
we are persuaded, and hold, that elk hunting by nonresidents in
Montana is not one of them."' 38 Thus, precedents such as Corfield
and its progeny may form a basis for a narrow construction of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause that would support the constitu-
twenty-five or thirty years past."); id. at 237 (statement of Rep. Smith) ('The Constitution
declares that every citizen of the United States shall have equal privileges in every other State.
That principle was denied to the whole North by the South unless the man adhered to the senti-
ments of the South."); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864) (statement of Sen.
Wilson) (maintaining that "the supporters of slavery enforced this disregard of the supremacy of
the Constitution and of the privileges and immunities of the citizen by every power and influ-
ence known to the communities cursed by the presence of a slave").
135 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
136 1d. at 551 (observing that "[w]hat these fundamental principles are, it would be perhaps
more tedious than difficult to enumerate"); see also Amy v. Smith, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 326, 333
(1822) (stating that rights guaranteed under privileges and immunities clause go beyond "ordi-
nary rights of personal security and property"); Abbot v. Bayley, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 89, 92
(1827) (stating that the rights of the privileges and immunities clause are to be enjoyed regard-
less of naturalization); Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562, 608 (1860) (noting that the rights of
citizens protected by the Constitution include those rights as understood by the Articles of
Confederation).
137436 U.S. 371 (1978); cf. Regents of the Univ. of Ca. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357
(1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that "no
fundamental right" was at issue in reviewing affirmative action program in medical school
admissions).
138 Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 388. But see id. at 402 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[A]n inquiry
into whether a given right is 'fundamental' has no place in our analysis of whether a State's
discrimination against nonresidents ... violates the Clause. Rather, our primary concern is the
State's justification for its discrimination.").
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tionality of race-conscious admissions programs.139
There are, however, arguments that might be made to support
an interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause under
which race-conscious university admissions programs would be
unconstitutional. For example, the clause's guarantee of "immuni-
ties" may be argued to include the "immunity" or freedom from
unequal burdens imposed by the government. 40  Some of the re-
marks made by Representative Bingham support this interpretation
of the clause. During the congressional debates, Bingham stated,
for example: "What does the word immunity in your Constitution
mean? Exemption from unequal burdens."'
141
Subsequent congressional interpretation of the amendment also
supports this reading to some extent. Commentators advancing
this interpretation have relied heavily on the debates over the 1875
Civil Rights Act, for example, during which congressional leaders
maintained that the Fourteenth Amendment had always been in-
tended to guarantee an across-the-board equality of rights.
142
However, such debates, which occurred years after the amend-
ment's ratification, are an inferior source for determining the
original meaning. Moreover, other commentators have argued that
139 Professor Harrison has argued, in contrast, that government benefits would constitute
"privileges or immunities" of citizenship:
In light of... Corfield, it is tempting to say that government benefits are more like
oyster beds than they are like the right to own property. This is unpersuasive, how-
ever, because there are many examples of government services known in the nine-
teenth century that very probably would have been classified as privileges or immu-
nities of citizenship.
Harrison, supra note 6, at 1456.
140 Representative Wilson described the term "immunity" as used in the Civil Rights Act as
follows:
What is an immunity? Simply "freedom or exemption from obligation;" an immu-
nity is "a right of exemption only," as "an exemption from serving in an office, or
performing duties which the law generally requires other citizens to perform." This
is all that is intended by the word "immunities" as used in this bill. It merely secures
to citizens of the United States equality in the exemptions of the law. A colored citi-
zen shall not, because he is colored, be subjected to obligations, duties, pains, and
penalties from which other citizens are exempted. Whatever exemptions there may
be shall apply to all citizens alike.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1 st Sess. 1117 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson).
141 Id. at 1089 (statement of Rep. Bingham); see also MALTZ, supra note 6, at 111-13
(pointing to statements about the segregated education system in Florida by Timothy Howe)
(citing CONG GLOBE, 39th Cong., I st Sess. App. 219-20 (1866)).
142 See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 6, at 1425 ("The debates on the [1875 Civil Rights] Act
are a rich source of information about how the Fourteenth Amendment was understood at the
time of its adoption, and they show that the equality theory of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause was prominent among Republicans."); McConnell, supra note 6, at 1099 ("[Tihe weight
of the evidence supports the proposition that segregation was understood in the years prior to the
end of Reconstruction to be unconstitutional, especially by those who had supported the Four-
teenth Amendment.").
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it is not clear that Congress adopted an interpretation of the
amendment as rigidly prohibiting government discrimination in its
debates over the 1875 Civil Rights Act.1
43
Nonetheless, this interpretation, if correct, suggests that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause may prohibit unequal taxation as
well as the use of public funds derived from tax revenues in a dis-
criminatory manner.' 44 If the term "immunity" could be so con-
strued, then to the extent that a race-conscious admissions program
imposed unequal burdens on various classes of citizens, it would
be unconstitutional.
B. The Equal Protection Clause
Even if one concluded, however, that the Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause did not afford a means of attacking racial prefer-
ences, the Equal Protection Clause might provide a basis for such a
challenge. The Equal Protection Clause provides that no state
shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws."1 45  On its, face, the clause therefore appears to
constitute a broad prohibition of racial discrimination by the state
governments. 146  Indeed, the Court's decisions in Grutter and
Gratz were based entirely on an analysis of this provision-the
much neglected Privileges or Immunities Clause did not figure in
143 See, e.g., Alfred Avins, De Facto and De Jure School Segregation: Some Reflected
Light on the Fourteenth Amendment from the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 38 Miss. L.J. 179, 246
(1967) (noting that Congress did not feel compelled by the Fourteenth Amendment to desegre-
gate schools); BERGER, supra note 6, at 148 ("The persistent acceptance of segregated schools
in the North is further evidenced by the history of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Although the
Act prohibited discrimination with respect to inns, public conveyances, and theaters, Congress,
despite Sumner's unflagging efforts, rejected a ban against segregated schools."); see also
Harrison, supra note 6, at 1427 (observing that during the debates, at least one member of
Congress "evidently believed that the choice between integration and separate-but-equal facili-
ties was a policy question left to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, along with other
substantive decisions concerning education"); McConnell, supra note 6, at 992 (observing that
members of Congress had "definite views about the limited nature of 'civil rights,' which did
not encompass all privileges or benefits").
44See, e.g., MALTZ, supra note 6, at 113 (arguing that the amendment could be interpreted
to mean that "whenever blacks were taxed at the same rate as whites, the state governments
would be under an obligation to provide equal services"); Harrison, supra note 6, at 1456
("[M]ost government benefits with which we are familiar will be privileges of citizenship be-
cause most of them are supported by general taxation."); id. at 1462-63 ("Schools financed by
general taxation are very probably a privilege of citizens. If so, to give individuals of different
races different versions of the privilege would constitute an abridgment."); McConnell, supra
note 6, at 1042 (observing that, in debates after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
members of Congress maintained that "the tax-supported character of... schools is a strong
additional reason to insist upon equality of treatment within them").
145 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
146 See Harrison, supra note 6, at 1411 (observing that "[sItandard equal protection juris-
prudence, faced with the inescapably general text of the clause, appeals to a notion of general
equality or impartiality in lawmaking").
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the Court's decisions at all.
147
Under a straightforward reading of the plain language of the
text, the Equal Protection Clause might be invoked to prohibit all
types of racial discrimination by state governments, including dis-
crimination in the provision of governmental benefits such as col-
lege and university admissions. 148  Indeed, the opinions in Gratz
and Grutter assume that the Equal Protection Clause applies in
such circumstances. The various opinions merely differ in the way
in which the clause is applied.
Yet, the possibility remains that the Equal Protection Clause
may have a much narrower scope. The most accurate reading of
the clause may restrict it to acts of the state government that in-
volve governmental "protection.' ' 149  Such a narrow construction
would greatly restrict the reach of the clause and might make it
inapplicable to university admissions decisions.
The structure of Section One may provide some support for
this interpretation. Each of the three clauses could be construed as
relating to a distinct function of the state government. The Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause may determine which substantive
rights are constitutionally protected. The Due Process Clause may
guarantee individuals the right to certain fundamental legal proc-
esses when they are pursuing their rights in court. Finally, the
Equal Protection Clause may relate primarily to enforcement of
1
47 In Grutter, for example, the Court held that "the Equal Protection Clause does not pro-
hibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a com-
pelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body."
123 S. Ct. at 2347. Similarly, in Gratz, the Court held that "because the University's use of race
in its current freshman admissions policy is not narrowly tailored to achieve respondents' as-
serted compelling interest in diversity, the admissions policy violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 123 S. Ct. at 2430.
148 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 82 (1990) (concluding that "[tihe text itself demonstrates that the equality under law was
the primary goal").
149 See Raoul Berger, Fantasizing About the Fourteenth Amendment: A Review Essay,
1990 WIs. L. REV. 1043, 1063 ("Intense focus on 'equality' has obscured the significance of the
word 'protection.' Yet it is 'protection' that is the subject of discourse; 'equal' is the modi-
fier."); Harrison, supra note 122, at 1229 (arguing that "the main antidiscrimination provision of
Section 1 is the Privileges or Immunities Clause, not the Equal Protection Clause" and conclud-
ing: "[I]t is likely that in 1866 most Republicans thought that the 'protection of the laws' consti-
tuted a subset of the functions of government. Specifically, the protection of the laws consisted
principally of those substantive provisions and government activities that shield people's rights
from invasion."); Harrison, supra note 6, at 1390 (arguing that the term "protection" used in the
clause suggests "either the administration of the laws or, if it is about their content, laws that
protect as opposed to laws that do other things" and that "[iun order for the clause to be a re-
quirement of equality in everything the states do, the word 'protection' must simply drop out, so
that the text would read 'equal laws' rather than the 'equal protection of the laws'); see also id.
at 1435 (arguing that "'protection of the laws' referred to the mechanisms through which the
government secured individuals and their rights against invasion by others").
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protective laws.
Under this interpretation, university admissions policies would
fall entirely outside the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. They
would fall outside of the scope of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause because they do not involve a "fundamental" right of citi-
zenship. They would fall outside the scope of the Due Process
Clause because they do not involve rights of legal process. Fi-
nally, they would fall outside the scope of the Equal Protection
Clause because they do not involve unequal treatment with respect
to the government's role as protector of individuals within its ju-
risdiction.
Proponents of this interpretation sometimes point to congres-
sional practice at the time of ratification. During Reconstruction,
they note, Congress enacted a series of race-conscious measures
such as the Freedman's Bureau Bill designed to assist newly-freed
slaves. 50  While many such measures were advanced before the
amendment was ratified and there is debate over the extent to
which such measures were truly race-conscious, proponents of this
interpretation maintain that they evidence a willingness to engage
in race-conscious decisionmaking by the individuals responsible
for drafting the Fourteenth Amendment. As a result, they claim
that such measures support an interpretation of the amendment that
would allow government to consider race as a factor at least in
certain contexts.
Yet, as in the case of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, a
counterargument may be constructed as well. One might assert,
for example, that the textual guarantee of equal protection "of the
laws" requires equal treatment whenever the state government
acts. In other words, the guarantee of equality would extend to
any governmental act or law. Under this interpretation, the provi-
sion of government benefits would fall under the clause, and any
discriminatory admissions procedures might be subject to constitu-
tional attack.
Such an interpretation finds support in Justice Harlan's dissent
in Plessy v. Ferguson, a case in which the Supreme Court upheld a
Louisiana statute that required "equal but separate accommoda-
50 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 397 (1978) (plurality o-
pinion) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("The Congress that passed the Fourteenth Amendment is the
same Congress that passed the 1866 Freedmen's Bureau Act, an Act that provided many of its
benefits only to Negroes."); id. at 398 ("Since the Congress that considered and rejected the
objections to the 1866 Freedmen's Bureau Act concerning special relief to Negroes also pro-
posed the Fourteenth Amendment, it is inconceivable that the Fourteenth Amendment was
intended to prohibit all race-conscious relief measures.").
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tions" on passenger trains.151 In his dissent, Justice Harlan focused
on the amendment's guarantee that citizens would enjoy an "im-
munity" from "legal discriminations." Quoting the Court's prior
ruling in Strauder v. West Virginia, Justice Harlan reiterated that:
[t]he words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory,
but they contain a necessary implication of a positive im-
munity or right, most valuable to the colored race-the
right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them
distinctively as colored-exemption from legal discrimina-
tions, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the se-
curity of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy,
and discriminations which are steps towards reducing them
to the condition of a subject race. 152
This determination was reinforced, Justice Harlan noted, in the
Court's subsequent decision in Gibson v. State, where it stated that
the amendment "'forbids, so far as civil and political rights are
concerned, discrimination by the General Government or the States
against any citizen because of his race." 153 Thus, while there was
not an extensive analysis of the text or history of the amendment in
Justice Harlan's dissent, he appears to have focused on the lan-
guage of "equality" and "immunity" in holding that the amend-
ment required governmental action to be "colorblind.,
154
Indeed, even the majority in Plessy acknowledged that the "object
of the [fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the abso-
lute equality of the two races before the law."' 55 The majority merely
concluded that the amendment did not enforce "social" equality. Ac-
cordingly, the restrictions regarding passenger accommodations fell
outside the scope of the amendment. In the words of the majority,
"the enforced Separation of the races, as applied to the internal com-
merce of the state, neither abridges the privileges or immunities of the
colored man, deprives him of his property without due process of law,
nor denies him the equal protection of the laws, within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment."'
156
On the other hand, Justice Harlan's dissent contains some lan-
151 163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896) (discussing the Louisiana statute).
15 2 1d. at 556 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1879)) (internal
quotes omitted).
153 Id. (quoting Gibson v. State, 162 U.S. 565, 567 (1896)).
154 See id. at 559 ("Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens.").
155 Id. at 544.
1561d. at 548.
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guage and analysis indicating that his interpretation may be much
more limited. For example, Justice Harlan observed that the
amendment's guarantees were intended to "protect all the civil
rights that pertain to freedom and citizenship," and reasoned that
the passenger restrictions were unconstitutional because they were
"inconsistent not only with that equality of rights which pertains to
citizenship, national and State, but with the personal liberty en-
joyed by every one within the United States."1 57 Indeed, Justice
Harlan claimed that the "fundamental objection" to the legislation
was the fact that it interfered "with the personal freedom of citi-
zens." 1 58 One might therefore conclude that Justice Harlan's dis-
sent is consistent with an interpretation of the amendment that
would not encompass governmental benefits, such as university
admissions. The restrictions on passengers were restraints on in-
dividual liberty-they did not involve governmentally-conferred
benefits that could only exist after the establishment of govern-
ment.
Whatever one concludes regarding the merits of each position,
either interpretation would provide a clear rule of decision. Under
the narrow interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, admis-
sions procedures such as those at issue in Grutter and Gratz would
fall outside the scope of the amendment. Under the broad reading
of the clause, they would not. In either case, the result of the
analysis would be a bright-line rule that would define the scope of
judicial power to scrutinize race-conscious admissions programs.
III. BARRIERS TO THE ORIGINALIST APPROACH
This virtue of the originalist approach may at the same time,
however, represent the primary barrier to its adoption. The
Court's ambivalence about the constitutionality of such programs
and its desire to take a flexible approach in resolving such ques-
tions may effectively rule out an originalist analysis.
First, there may be sufficient historical indeterminacy to make
the application of the amendment in the context of university ad-
missions programs extremely difficult. As outlined above, 159
157 Id. at 555.
1581d. at 557 (citing Blackstone's Commentaries and noting that "personal liberty" was
traditionally understood as the "power of locomotion" free from restraint). Moreover, even
Justice Harlan's pronouncement that the Constitution is "color-blind" appears limited to a no-
tion of "civil rights," for in the very next sentence he notes: "In respect of civil rights, all citi-
zens are equal before the law." Id. at 559 (emphasis added).
159 See supra Part 1H. See also PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTs, supra note 6, at
117 ("There is room for reasonable disagreement about the original meaning of the second
sentence of section 1" of the Fourteenth Amendment.).
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originalist arguments can be constructed on both sides of this ques-
tion. While a full analysis of the relevant historical materials may
render a definitive conclusion, in the Court's view these conflict-
ing arguments may undermine the use of the historical record to
decide the constitutionality of race-based admissions programs.
Second, even if such application were feasible, it would not al-
low the Court to act with the flexibility that it sought to embody in
its rulings. Either race-conscious admissions programs are subject
to constitutional scrutiny or they are not. The originalist approach
suggested here would allow very little room for compromise. In-
deed, it would dictate that at least one of the Court's decisions in
Grutter or Gratz was incorrect.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the originalist ap-
proach clashes with the Court's precedents. If one concludes that
government benefits and other similar state actions fall outside the
scope of the clause, then the Court's decisions invalidating race-
conscious measures in such situations would be at odds with the
originalist interpretation. Foremost among these would be the
Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education. Indeed, a fun-
damental problem inherent in attempting to justify race-based ad-
missions measures is attempting to reconcile those measures with
the prohibition on such race-conscious decisionmaking that was at
the heart of the Brown decision.
A. Historical Indeterminacy
As noted above, one can construct arguments based on the his-
torical record that would support either upholding or invalidating
race-conscious admissions programs.1 60  If one gives these argu-
ments equal credence, they would tend to support the conclusion
that the historical record is indeterminate. Indeed, even during the
debates over the amendment and associated enactments, certain
members of Congress themselves expressed some uncertainty con-
cerning the meaning of the terms they were embodying in the Con-
stitution. 161
160 See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 6, at 123 ("Historical analysis of the framing and ratifica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot, by itself, resolve the dilemma created by the conflict-
ing commitments of those who participated in the process.").
161 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3041 (1866) (statement of Sen. Johnson)
("I think it is quite objectionable to provide that 'no State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,' simply because I do
not understand what will be the effect of that.").
Similarly, in conjunction with the Civil Rights Act, Representative Kerr noted that the pro-
posal did not "define the term 'civil rights and immunities."' Id. at 1270. As a result, there was
the potential for different interpretations:
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The "indeterminate" nature of the historical record may be one
reason that the Court has refrained from engaging in an extensive
analysis of the text and history of the amendment in its affirmative
action decisions. The Court in Brown, for example, explicitly es-
chewed historical analysis in favor of an analysis of the social sci-
ence evidence regarding the effects of segregation.162 Members of
the Court may believe that the historical record is too unclear to
provide useful guidance.
Moreover, even if one develops a coherent theory of the origi-
nal meaning of the amendment, application of that meaning in re-
viewing race-conscious university admissions programs may prove
daunting. The framers of the amendment did not address the spe-
cific question of affirmative action programs in higher education.
Thus, applying their general theories to this particular problem
raises additional complications.
Nonetheless, coherent originalist theories can be constructed
and applied in determining the constitutionality of affirmative ac-
tion programs. Accordingly, the alleged indeterminacy of the his-
torical record does not constitute an insurmountable barrier to an
originalist analysis.1 63  Indeed, the Court in other contexts rou-
tinely undertakes such an analysis where the historical record is
less than clear. Any purported "indeterminacy" should therefore
not impose a significant barrier to an originalist approach.
B. A Clear Cut Rule of Decision
A more compelling reason the Court may not have relied upon
the text and history of the amendment is that it would not allow the
Court to adopt a flexible approach in its affirmative action deci-
sions. In particular, the majority opinion in Grutter evidences a
desire to review affirmative action programs on an individual ba-
What are such rights? One writer says civil rights are those which have no relation
to the establishment, support, or management of the Government. Another says they
are the rights of a citizen; rights due from one citizen to another, the privation of
which is a civil injury for which redress may be sought in a civil action. Other au-
thors define all these terms in different ways, and assign to them larger or narrower
definitions according to their views. Who shall settle these questions? Who shall
define these terms?
Id. at 1270-71.
162 See infra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
163 See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CH|. L. REV.
519, 578 (2003) ("[O]riginalists certainly do not have to abandon their approach simply because
it sometimes will identify only a range of 'original meanings.' Indeed, Professor Whittington
argues that originalism's capacity to accommodate textual indeterminacy is one of its advan-
tages." (footnote omitted)).
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sis, which in that particular case resulted in a unique standard of
"deference" to such programs in the educational context and the
imposition of a durational limit where none was supplied. An
originalist analysis, in contrast, would most likely require a bright-
line decision concerning whether affirmative action programs fall
within the scope of the constitutional guarantee.164
Indeed, even the dissenters in Grutter did not take a strictly
originalist approach. For example, while Justice Thomas noted
that the majority had suggested that "racial discrimination in
higher education admissions will be illegal in 25 years" and stated
that he dissented from much of the majority's opinion on the
ground that the "Constitution means the same thing today as it will
in 300 months,"'' 65 his opinion focuses primarily on the non-
historical framework crafted by the Court in its prior cases. That
approach, which involves the application of different levels of
scrutiny to various categories of claims, finds no basis in the text
or history of the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet, Justice Thomas
went to great lengths to point out how the majority's analysis was
flatly inconsistent with the framework it had developed in prior
cases. In particular, according to Justice Thomas, the "deference"
the majority gave to the University of Michigan Law School ad-
missions program was inconsistent with the "strict scrutiny" the
Court sought to apply in that case. 166
Nonetheless, Justice Thomas did cite the standard announced
by Justice Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson,167 which would prohibit
all racial discrimination by enforcing a "color-blind" Constitu-
tion. 68 Justice Harlan's opinion, in turn, was at least based on
some analysis of the history of the amendment and the meaning
that its drafters and ratifiers attributed to it. Moreover, the ulti-
mate outcome reached by Justice Thomas would have applied a
rigid rule of nondiscrimination, similar to that which might be dic-
tated under an originalist analysis.
Justice Thomas's opinion, however, is the closest that any of
the members of the Court came to examining the text and history
of the amendment. The need or desire to adopt a flexible approach
in reviewing university admissions programs in the Court's view
164 See supra Part I.
1
65 Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2351 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). See also id. at 2361 (asserting that majority's ruling "grant[s] a 25-year
license to violate the Constitution").
166 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
167 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
'm Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2365 (citing Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559).
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apparently was more significant than strict adherence to the his-
torical understanding of the constitutional text. As for the dissent-
ers in Grutter, the historical evidence supporting the constitution-
ality of affirmative action programs may have resulted in their
silence on this question. 169
C. Constraining the Scope of the Court's Power
A third reason the Court may have eschewed an originalist ap-
proach is that it would largely constrain the scope of the Court's
own power. If the Court had concluded that governmental benefits
fell outside the scope of the guarantee afforded by the Fourteenth
Amendment, it would have effectively eliminated an entire class of
cases over which it formerly exercised power. If, in contrast, it
adopted the "colorblind" interpretation of Justice Harlan in Plessy,
it would have been constrained to apply a rigid prohibition on the
use of race in all contexts by government actors. In either case,
the Court's own power would be significantly curtailed.
This outcome, itself, may have been undesirable in the Court's
eyes. In recent decades, the Court has taken upon itself the role of
moral arbiter. In cases such as Roe v. Wade 70 and Brown v. Board
of Education171 the Court has assumed the task of providing rules
governing complex and politically divisive moral and social issues,
even in instances where its authority to do so is not clear. The
decision in Lawrence v. Texas 172 is the most recent example of the
Court imposing its own moral judgments in the context of a par-
ticularly divisive social issue, determining that the right to privacy
extended to consensual sodomy among adults based on, among
other things, norms of international law. Given its expansive view
of its own role in defining and resolving moral issues, it is unlikely
that the Court would step back or constrain its own ability to pass
judgment on affirmative action programs.
169 Cf. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 427 (observing that "Congress in the 1860s repeatedly
enacted statutes allocating special benefits to blacks on the express basis of race" and arguing
that "to be true to their principles, two of the five Justices in the prevailing anti-affirmative
action majority-Justices Scalia and Thomas, whose commitment to original understandings
and practices is also a matter of record-should drop their categorical opposition to race-based
affirmative action measures").
170410 U.S. 113 (1973).
171 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
172 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2483 (2003) (upholding constitutional right to sodomy on the ground
that "[t]he right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of human
freedom in many other countries"). But see id. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("What Texas has
chosen to do is well within the range of traditional democratic action, and its hand should not be
stayed through the invention of a brand-new 'constitutional right' by a Court that is impatient of
democratic change.").
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The result is the fact-bound test adopted in Grutter and Gratz,
which crafts a significant role for the judiciary in passing judgment
on race-conscious measures. As noted above, 173 the Court's deci-
sions raise more questions than they answer, all of which must be
subject to judicial resolution. Moreover, the test that the Court
appears to have crafted depends so heavily on the individual facts
and circumstances of the particular program at issue, that the role
of the courts in making such determinations has been dramatically
expanded.
D. The Supreme Court's Precedents Regarding Race-Conscious
Decision-Making
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, another fundamental
obstacle to the implementation of an originalist analysis in the af-
firmative action context is the Supreme Court's adherence to its
ruling in Brown v. Board of Education.174 The Court in Brown
held that "separate but equal" public education systems violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 75 An
originalist analysis that would uphold the affirmative action pro-
grams at issue in Grutter and Gratz on the ground that government
benefits such as public education do not fall within the scope of
the constitutional guarantee would require the Court to overrule its
prior decision in Brown in order to uphold the University of
Michigan's racially discriminatory educational policies. Thus, the
proponents of affirmative action and the Court would have to con-
front the obvious inconsistency with Brown.
In its decision in Brown, the Court acknowledged that the par-
ties had focused on the "circumstances surrounding the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868," including "consideration of
the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states, then exist-
ing practices in racial segregation, and the views of proponents and
opponents of the Amendment."'' 76 The Court, however, rejected
such authorities, succinctly stating that they were "inconclusive"
and that the discussion by the parties and the Court's "own inves-
tigation" convinced it that "although these sources cast some light,
it is not enough to resolve the problem" with which the Court was
173 See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
174 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
1751d. at 495; see also id. ("[W]e hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for
whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived
of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
176 Id. at 489.
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confronted. 177 Instead, the Court chose to "consider public educa-
tion in the light of its full development and its present place in
American life throughout the Nation.' 78
Thus, the Court's decision was not based on an analysis of the
historical record. Nonetheless, one can construct originalist argu-
ments on both sides of the question. Under one interpretation, a
strict rule of nondiscrimination would apply. Under another, how-
ever, government benefits such as public education would fall out-
side the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment's constitutional guar-
antee and, as a result, the states would remain free to adopt what-
ever policies they saw fit with respect to such benefits, even if
racially discriminatory.
There is, therefore, a fundamental tension between the Court's
ruling in Grutter and its decision in Brown. The Court in Brown
held that racial discrimination in public education was prohibited.
It did not give any "deference" to the state's decision to maintain a
segregated school system. Indeed, it did not give any credence to
the state's reasoning in maintaining such a system at all. Rather,
the Court engaged in a straightforward application of the Equal
Protection guarantee and declared that "separate but equal" school
systems were not "equal" and therefore were constitutionally pro-
hibited. This straightforward approach contrasts sharply with the
approach taken by the majority in Grutter.
Indeed, this point was recognized by Justice Thomas in his
separate opinion. 179  Justice Thomas observed that the majority
opinion upholding the law school's affirmative action program
contained "the seed of a new constitutional justification
for . . . racial segregation."' 80 For, as Justice Thomas observed, if
an educational institution's decisions regarding the value of "di-
versity" were entitled to deference, then a decision regarding the
value of "racial homogeneity" would "similarly be given defer-
177 Id.
178 Id. at 492-93.
179 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2358-59 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Petitioners in Gratz also raised this parallel, quoting the amicus
brief filed by the United States in Brown:
[Riacial discriminations imposed by law, or having the sanction or support of gov-
emnment, inevitably tend to undermine the foundations of a society dedicated to free-
dom, justice, and equality. The proposition that all men are created equal is not mere
rhetoric. It implies a rule of law-an indispensable condition to a free society-
under which all men stand equal and alike in the rights and opportunities secured to
them by their government.
Petitioner's Brief at 14, Gratz (No. 02-516) (quoting Brief Amicus Curiae of the United States,
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 1)).
80 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2358 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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ence."' 18 While Justice Thomas used the example of Historically
Black Colleges,182 which are almost entirely racially homogenous,
the same principle might be applied to an all-white institution.
Thus, as Justice Thomas implicitly recognized, the majority's
rationale in Grutter is inconsistent with the Court's ruling in
Brown. An originalist analysis that would uphold affirmative ac-
tion programs such as that sketched above would entail overruling
the Court's prior decision in Brown, a result that would be unten-
able for those advocating such programs. Thus, while most of the
parties filing briefs with the Court completely ignored the original
meaning of the amendment, those who did cite the historical re-
cord failed to address the inherent tension with Brown. Rather,
they merely cited the history of race-conscious measures enacted
by Congress designed to benefit newly-freed slaves, such as the
Freedman's Bureau Bill, and suggested that congressional practice
supported the constitutionality of race-conscious programs.,
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The irony is that, had the Court not taken its much-criticized
181 Id.
182See id.; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae The Claremont Institute Center for Constitu-
tional Jurisprudence in Support of Petitioners at 9, Grutter (No. 02-241) & Gratz (No. 02-516)
("[T]reating 'diversity' as a compelling interest might allow, perhaps even require, states to ban
historically black colleges, or the federal government to exclude them from Title VI funding, a
proposition that, one might just as easily assume, the four Bakke dissenters would have soundly
rejected.").
Justice Thomas also observed that the Court in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515
(1996), gave no deference to the Virginia Military Institute in ruling that its exclusion of women
was unconstitutional even though the Institute's policies regarding admission of women were
subject to only intermediate scrutiny. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2358-59 (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) ("[I1n Virginia, where the standard of review dictated that
greater flexibility be granted to VMI's educational policies than the Law School deserves here,
this Court gave no deference.").
183 See, e.g., Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. and the
American Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 29, Grutter (No.
02-241) ("The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes that one of its chief
objectives was to secure the constitutionality of race-conscious legislation enacted by the
Thirty-ninth Congress."); Brief of Amherst et al. Amici Curiae, Supporting Respondents at 29,
Grutter (No. 02-241) & Gratz (No. 02-516) ("Given the repeated enactment of race-conscious
legislation by the Congress that adopted the Fourteenth Amendment in order to close the social
gap between blacks and whites, the Court could not fairly conclude that the 'original under-
standing' of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits what Bakke permits."); Brief Amici Curiae of
the Coalition for Economic Equity et al. at 8, Grutter (No. 02-241) ("Petitioner's view of pure
colorblindness contradicts the original purpose of the Equal Protection Clause-to ensure mean-
ingful equality for groups subordinated under law and by social practice."); Brief Amici Curiae
of the Hispanic National Bar Association and the Hispanic Association of Colleges and Univer-
sities in Support of Respondents at 8, Grutter (No. 02-241) ("That the original intent of the
Members of Congress who framed the Fourteenth Amendment was to aid discrete minorities
ineluctably leads to the conclusion that race-conscious legislation is constitutional."); id. at 10
("Since the drafters of both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment sup-
ported the Freedman's Bureau legislation, it follows that the equal protection language of the
Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to eliminate the racial restrictions within the Freed-
man's Acts.").
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detour from the original meaning in Brown, 184 its decision in Grut-
ter may have been placed on a more solid footing. Thus, propo-
nents of judicial, rather than political, action to end segregation
who might now favor government-sponsored affirmative action
programs, find themselves impeded by precedent that precludes an
originalist analysis that would support their position.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court's recent affirmative action decisions represent an
abandonment of the broad principle of non-discrimination the
Court established in Brown and reaffirmed in cases such as Croson
and Adarand. These decisions therefore are consistent with the
views of those commentators who have advanced a narrow inter-
pretation of the constitutional guarantee under the Fourteenth
Amendment and have questioned the Court's adherence to the
original meaning in its decision in Brown.
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Yet, the basis given for the Court's decision in Grutter was
quite different. The Court did not rely upon the original meaning
of the amendment in reaching its decision. Nor did it address the
tension between its ruling in Grutter and its ruling in Brown.
Rather, it crafted unique standards in the context of affirmative
action in higher education in order to justify its deviation from
established precedent and to ensure that its ruling in Grutter could
not be applied to justify race-conscious measures outside the con-
text of higher education.
Had the Court undertaken an originalist analysis, its decision
might have been more coherent. However, it would be difficult, if
'8 See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown v. Board of Education: Facts and Political Cor-
rectness, 80 VA. L. REV. 185, 185 (1994) ("Brown was not an unambiguously correct decision
either for the justices or the American public in 1954, and to formulate constitutional theories on
the basis of ahistorical judgments is at the very least unconstructive, and possibly quite insidi-
ous."); McConnell, supra note 6, at 952 ("[T]here is something close to a consensus that Brown
was inconsistent with the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, except perhaps
at an extremely high and indeterminate level of abstraction."); Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 432
("[N]early no one today is a true equal protection originalist, because true equal protection
originalism would repudiate Brown v. Board of Education."). But see McConnell, supra note 6,
at 1140 ("Most commentators have assumed that the ahistorical quality of Brown was unavoid-
able, because an historical approach to the question would have produced a morally unaccept-
able answer. This Article shows, to the contrary, that school segregation was understood during
Reconstruction to violate the principles of equality of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
185 See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 6, at 146-54 (arguing that Brown was wrongly decided);
MALTZ, supra note 6, at 157 (observing that "conservative Republicans" had opposed measures
that "explicitly provided Congress with sweeping authority over matters that had hitherto been
the exclusive province of the state governments or that implicitly suggested that the Constitution
was an open-ended grant of power to the federal government to deal with matters that might
appear to be of national concern").
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not impossible, to construct an originalist interpretation that would
at the same time uphold the use of racial preferences in Grutter
and invalidate them in Gratz. Moreover, an originalist approach
would not provide the flexibility that the Court apparently sought
to embody in its affirmative action decisions. Accordingly, the
Court's decisions in Grutter and Gratz represent a powerful exam-
ple of the Court's rejection of its role as interpreter of the laws and
an adoption of a plainly policymaking function.

